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AGE OF UNREASON:  
RATIONALITY AND THE REGULATORY STATE 
Louise Weinberg* 
ABSTRACT
A curious phenomenon, not previously remarked, appears in 
current international and interstate cases in a common 
configuration. These are cases in which a nonresident sues a 
company at the company’s home; the plaintiff would almost 
certainly win there on stipulated facts; and judgment is for the 
defendant as a matter of law. In cases in this familiar 
configuration it appears that courts will struggle to find rationales. 
Judges attempt to rely on arguments which ordinarily would be 
serviceable, but which, in cases so configured, seem to become 
irrational. Because the relevant configuration of cases is common, 
the problem is widespread. And it is serious. A judgment 
unsupported by good reasons will appear to be a naked preference 
for the judgment winner. The Supreme Court has held that the bare 
appearance of a want of neutrality is a denial of due process. 
Many cases are cited, but this Article focuses on two recent 
examples, seemingly unrelated. The first example is a prominent 
international case in the United States Supreme Court, raising an 
issue of statutory construction. The second is an interstate case in a 
state supreme court, raising an issue of choice of law. But these 
disparate examples are importantly similar in that both are in the 
above-described configuration, and in both, the trial court 
withholds its own law. And in both, the court has trouble finding 
rational support for the outcome. This difficulty seems to be 
virtually inevitable in cases so configured. Critical and explanatory 
analyses are offered. The interstate example also raises a special 
problem of legal theory, discussed here as well. 
                                                   
 *  William B. Bates Chair in the Administration of Justice and Professor of Law, the 
University of Texas, Austin. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at a faculty work-
shop at the University of Texas Law School, Austin, March 26, 2018. I am grateful to Jeffrey 
Abramson, Jennifer Laurin, Tom McGarity, Susan Morse, and Melissa Wasserman for help-
ful comments. 
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INTRODUCTION
This Article is about a previously unremarked but striking phe-
nomenon, appearing in current international and interstate cases. 
These are cases in a discrete but common configuration. In this 
configuration of cases, defending lawyers offer arguments that are 
ordinarily effectual, and judges ruling for a defendant try to make 
use of these arguments. But the usual defenses turn out to make 
little sense. 
This strange difficulty is apparently a function of the shape of 
the litigation in which it arises. These are cases in which the plain-
tiff has come to a defendant company’s home to file suit; the plain-
tiff would almost certainly win there on stipulated facts; and judg-
ment is for the defendant company as a matter of law. The court 
holds, on some ground, that the case cannot go forward. Or an 
appellate court reverses, sometimes reversing judgment on a jury 
verdict. But in such cases arguments supporting judgment for the 
defendant are very likely to turn sour. The ensuing struggle for 
reason can readily be seen in published opinions in cases in this 
configuration.
A quick look at the typical scenario will show the reader what I 
mean. Suppose that in a transnational case an American company 
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is sued at home by a foreigner for a tort in violation of an act of 
Congress. The stipulated facts are such that the American compa-
ny almost certainly would lose on the merits under the statute. In 
other words, the foreigner is forum shopping and seeks the benefit 
of our law. 
Since, ex hypothesi, the defendant company is likely to lose on the 
merits, it cannot easily find defenses on the merits. At best, the de-
fendant can argue for a new construction of the statute, but any 
found chink in the statute is likely to be regarded by some observ-
ers as a misconstruction. If the statute could rationally be so con-
strued, the foreign plaintiff would not have come to the United 
States to sue. Plausible arguments wholly off the merits fare even 
worse. I do not refer to dispositive defenses off the merits, such as a 
short period of limitations. Had there been a dispositive defense 
here, the foreign plaintiff would not have brought suit here. 
Now suppose that the American defendant moves to dismiss, 
and the federal court grants the motion. The court relies chiefly 
on the argument that adjudicating the case would be injurious to 
the foreign relations of the United States. It also emphasizes that 
the foreign place of injury, which is also the place where the plain-
tiff resides, is more nearly concerned with the case than is the 
United States, since our only contact with the case is as residence 
of the defendant company. On such facts our contact with the case 
might be argued to be so tenuous as to make the case extraterrito-
rial to us. Often, too, a dismissing court will rely on a choice of for-
eign law, or a putatively more convenient forum abroad. 
It appears to be a characteristic feature of cases thus configured 
that these sorts of considerations, usually quite effective, lose force. 
Ex hypothesi, American law in such cases is plaintiff-favoring. (The 
reader will recall that the foreign plaintiff has come to our courts 
shopping for our law.) In these cases, the usual defenses tend to 
benefit the foreign plaintiff, not the American defendant raising 
the defense. When judgment for the defendant in such a case is 
sought to be supported by judicial concern for our foreign rela-
tions, for example, it is often the fact that a failure to allow the for-
eign plaintiff to proceed is more likely to offend the plaintiff’s home 
country. The foreign country would be best accommodated by af-
fording the benefit of American law to the foreign country’s own 
national. 
Or, to take another example, suppose that the court rules that 
the plaintiff’s home country—Scotland, let us say—has “the more 
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significant contact”1 with the case, since it was also the place of in-
jury as well as the plaintiff’s home country. Therefore, Scottish law, 
which provides a defense in such cases, should be applied—
especially since deference to Scottish law would be in exercise of a 
benevolent comity. 
Yet Scotland has no interest in applying its defense. Defenses are 
naturally enacted or devised for the benefit of local companies and 
companies doing business in the locality. Scotland has zero interest 
in protecting from liability all the world’s companies. It has zero 
interest in protecting from liability an American company without 
any connection with Scotland. And Scotland has zero interest in 
frustrating a Scottish citizen’s chance to recover in America from 
an American company. 
Cases, of course, can go either way. So it is not unusual for 
American courts to conform to our examples, and to give judg-
ment for the American defendant. But in such cases the judgment 
is all too likely to have been awarded to the defendant home party 
for no good reason—that is, for reasons which, as we have just 
seen, can have less rational application in the case than might have 
been expected. The phenomenon occurs in both international 
and interstate litigation. 
Unfortunately, when handing down this sort of ordinary judg-
ment in a case configured in the ordinary way just described, rely-
ing on the ordinarily persuasive sorts of reasons here noted, a 
court can strip its judgment of an appearance of neutrality. The 
problem is serious, and it is widespread.2 If the judgment lacks a 
                                                   
 1. This is the widely adopted formula set out in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT 
OF LAWS (1967). 
 2. The following are selections of current transnational and interstate cases in federal 
courts and state high courts, tending to show near-arbitrary decisions not to enforce law 
when it would regulate the conduct of a defendant. (State lower-court cases or earlier cases 
are too numerous for inclusion.) 
In the Supreme Court of the United States, for a few representative recent transnation-
al examples, see, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856 (2017) (denying foreign detain-
ees a right to sue federal officials because the action to enforce the Constitution is “disfa-
vored”); RJR Nabisco v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) (discussed here) 
(denying relief for foreign nations suing an allegedly racketeering American company be-
cause the statute does not repeat its language of extraterritoriality when incorporating legis-
lation having such language); Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2882 
(2010) (denying relief to purchasers of stock in an action against an American defendant to 
enforce American law against fraud in the sale of securities on the ground that the stock 
exchange and transactions thereon were abroad). 
For a recent interstate case in the Supreme Court, see Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 136 
S. Ct. 1277 (2016) (setting a $50,000 cap on damages on the novel ground that the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause requires a state to apply its own law; attempting to justify this by de-
tecting “hostility” at the forum state, although the state’s high court had remittitured most 
of the jury’s award, reducing damages from some $450 million to $1 million). 
In the United States Courts of Appeals, for representative recent transnational cases, 
see, e.g., Armada (Singapore) PTE v. Amcol Internat’l Corp., 885 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 2018) 
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rational basis it will appear, at least to those alert to the problem, 
like a naked preference for the home party. The Supreme Court 
has held that the bare appearance of a want of neutrality is a denial 
of due process.3 I think of this as a “neutrality difficulty.” 
                                                   
(affirming dismissal of a Civil RICO claim against an Illinois defendant because the injury 
occurred abroad, although the defendant’s conduct was within the regulatory scope of the 
statute); Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018) (on remand, ruling, in pertinent 
part, that our foreign relations with Mexico would be damaged if we allowed the grieving 
Mexican family to recover for the wrongful death of their boy at the hands of a United 
States border official, where Mexico had filed a brief urging justice for the family); Mujica v. 
Airscan Inc., 771 F.3d 580 (9th Cir. 2014) (ruling that wrongful death and personal injuries 
claims by Colombian citizens against an American company could not go forward under the 
Torture Victims Protection Act because not justiciable under the doctrine of “international 
comity,” notwithstanding the statute); Bulgaria Ltd. v. Bulgarian-American Enterprise Fund, 
589 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal for forum non conveniens of a case by a Brit-
ish company against an American organization on the ground that Bulgarian courts are not 
inadequate). 
In the United States District Courts, for a few representative recent examples, see, e.g., 
Dantas v. Citibank, 2018 WL 3023158 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (dismissing for “prudential” consider-
ations “favoring settlements” a challenge by a foreign plaintiff to a settlement with an Amer-
ican defendant allegedly obtained under duress); Gerba v. Nat’l Hellenic Museum, 2018 WL 
3068409 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (dismissing a nonresident plaintiff’s action for retaliatory firing of a 
whistleblower because the complaint alleged wrongdoing, but not that the wrongdoing was 
criminal); Otto Candies v. Citigroup, 2018 WL 3008740 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (dismissing for fo-
rum non conveniens a case brought by various foreign companies against an American com-
pany alleging conspiracy to commit violations of RICO in a wide range of countries on the 
supposition that Mexican courts are adequate and more convenient). 
In the state supreme courts, for a few recent representative transnational cases, see, e.g.,
America K-9 Detection Services, LLC v. Freeman, 556 S.W.3d 246 (Tex. 2018) (holding non-
justiciable under the “political questions” doctrine a negligence case involving a contract 
working-dog biting a civilian on a foreign military base); Aranda v. Philip Morris, 2018 WL 
1415215 (Del. 2018) (affirming dismissal for forum non conveniens in a case brought by Ar-
gentine tobacco farmers to challenge an American grower’s demand that they use pesticides 
causing illness in growers’ employees); Gramercy Emerging Markets Fund v. Allied Irish 
Banks, P.L.C, 173 A.3d 1033 (Del. 2017) (affirming dismissal for forum non conveniens of 
claims “arising” in Bulgaria); Jahnke v. Deere & Co, 2018 WL 2271338 (Iowa 2018) (holding 
an Iowa civil rights statute could not be applied extraterritorially to an Iowan alleging dis-
crimination in employment by an American company when it demoted him by transferring 
him to a post in Iowa from a better position in China). 
In interstate cases in the state supreme courts, for a few recent representative exam-
ples, see, e.g., MM.M. v. Pfizer, Inc., 239 W.Va. 876 (2017) (applying the law of a state without 
any interest in its application); Ross v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 89 N.E.3d 763 (Ill. 2017) 
(mandating interlocutory review of a denial of a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens,
which is discretionary); Bayer Corp. v. Hon. Joan L. Moriarty, 536 S.W.3d 227 (Mo. 2017) 
(en banc) (holding that nonresident plaintiffs could obtain neither specific nor general ju-
risdiction in Missouri over a corporation, notwithstanding that there already was jurisdiction 
in a parallel action by similarly injured Missouri plaintiffs); Almond v. Rudolph, 794 S.E.2d 
10 (W.Va. 2016) (holding unavailable a writ of prohibition to prevent dismissal of nonresi-
dents from a product liability class suit, on grounds of forum non conveniens); American Elec-
tric Power Co. v. Swope, 301 S.E.2d 485 (W.Va. 2017) (granting a writ of prohibition against 
denial of a motion to dismiss on the assumption that Ohio law must govern); Laugelle v. 
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. 10C–12–054, 2013 WL 5460164 (Del. Super. 2013) (in a 
wrongful death suit, applying the law of the place of the grieving family’s mental anguish to 
deny recovery for mental anguish). 
 3. See Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (holding that a state su-
preme court judge’s repeated refusal to recuse himself created an appearance of a want of 
neutrality in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, where a 
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When I speak of “neutrality,” I do not mean to suggest some 
equivalence between plaintiffs and defendants. The blindness of 
Lady Justice is not a blindness to the difference between those who 
can plead injuries and those who allegedly caused them. Blind Jus-
tice, rather, would decline to place on the scales all distinctions of 
status, power, or wealth; all distinctions of person, fealty, or belief; 
and, above all, any connection between a party and the judge that 
nevertheless adjudicates that party’s case. The connection could be 
familial or commercial. It could be the appearance of a bribe or a 
threat. Perhaps the most common connection between a court and 
a litigant is the widely presumed home court advantage enjoyed by 
a resident party in an interstate or international case. 
To the extent that the home court advantage exists, it is a slight 
but not trivial predilection of judges to favor a valuable or vulnera-
ble local enterprise. This protective inclination could be what 
comes into play in our narrowly defined but common configura-
tion of cases. Or it could be an ideological or political defendant-
orientedness. Like plaintiff-orientedness, defendant-orientedness is 
a psychological reality about which there is little useful to be said 
or done. Such predilections, conscious or unconscious, seem likely 
to be at play in litigation generally. But it is only in our specific 
configuration of cases that judgment for the defendant so depend-
ably seems to entail a struggle for, and failure of, reason. 
As for the shopped-for home law in the configuration of cases 
under study here, I would characterize it, in the run of cases, as 
“regulatory.” The defendant resides at the forum state, but forum 
law does not favor the defendant. It exposes the defendant to lia-
bility. We will be exploring, here, the limits, if any, of the reach of 
regulatory law beyond borders. In particular, we will be investigat-
ing the curious irrationality of argument accompanying a court’s 
departure from its own regulatory law. And we will come up against 
that little “neutrality difficulty.” 
We will be working with two illustrative—but very different—
cases. Our international case turns on statutory construction. Our 
interstate case turns on choice of law. What these two disparate 
cases have in common is that, in each, the nonresident has come 
to the defendant’s home to find favorable law there. In other 
words, local law, from the point of view of the resident company, is 
regulatory. In each of our examples, the court at the defendant’s 
home looks with disfavor at the nonresident plaintiff’s case, and 
local law is held unavailable. And, in each, there ensues a struggle 
                                                   
party appearing before an appellate panel that included that judge had contributed $3 mil-
lion to his election campaign). 
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for reason. Reasonable and ordinary justifications for withholding 
local law in cases configured like this will appear insufficient to 
support the result. This struggle for reason is the strange feature 
that prompted the writing of this paper. 
In these dissimilar examples, we find that the neutrality difficul-
ty—in itself a denial of due process—carries with it not only the 
curious irrationality of argument that engenders it, but also a host 
of other signs of dysfunction. These include an inattentiveness to 
the regulatory interests of the sovereign adjudicating the case; a 
disregard of the judicial oath of office; a challenge to democratic 
theory; and ultimately a sense that the rule of law has been impo-
tent and that there has been a failure of justice. 
I. OUR INTERNATIONAL CASE: RJR-NABISCO V. EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY
A. A Troubled History 
Consider the 2016 Supreme Court case of RJR-Nabisco¸ Inc. v. Eu-
ropean Community.4 RJR-Nabisco involved seriously tortious—indeed, 
criminal—violations of an act of Congress, the federal anti-
racketeering law familiarly known as RICO.5
In RICO, Congress took hold of the problem of organized 
crime. RICO offers not only criminal penalties and government 
enforcement mechanisms civil in form, but also, with so-called 
“Civil RICO,” a statutory private right to sue for damages6—
damages that are trebled.7 Corporations as well as organized Mafia-
                                                   
 4. 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). For recent comment on RJR-Nabisco from another structural 
perspective, see Zachary D. Clopton, Diagonal Public Enforcement, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1077 
(2018). On the territorialism of RJR-Nabisco, see Victoria Safran, RICO’s Extraterritorial Reach: 
The Impact of European Community v. RJR-Nabisco, 4 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 47 (2017); Note, 
“Supreme Court Review,” Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act—
Extraterritoriality—RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 130 HARV. L. REV. 487 (2016). 
 5. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–
1968. 
 6. 18 U.S.C. § 1964. 
 7. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). This provision in RICO is modeled on the Clayton Act. See S. 
REP. NO. 91-617 at 79, 80–81 (stating that “[t]he committee feels . . . that much can be ac-
complished here by adopting the civil remedies developed in the antitrust field to the prob-
lem of organized crime”). As in the Clayton Act, and as is usual when Congress provides for 
treble damages, Civil RICO also provides for attorney fees and costs. 18 U.S.C. § 1964. One 
might suppose that punitive damages also would be available under Civil Rico. But, as in 
antitrust suits under the Clayton Act, punitive damages are considered to be subsumed un-
der treble damages. Cf. Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 
492 U.S. 257 (1989) (approving an award of treble damages on a federal antitrust claim and 
punitive damages on a pendent state claim). 
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like groups can be drawn into Civil RICO litigation if they engage 
in certain criminal activities in violation of RICO.8
The alleged tortfeasor in RJR-Nabisco had originally been a pros-
perous American corporation, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, 
growing tobacco in North Carolina and producing Camel ciga-
rettes.9 As concern developed about the hazards of smoking, R. J. 
Reynolds originated filtered cigarettes, and later, mentholated cig-
arettes. But the link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer 
was becoming clearer. The long ordeal of litigation against the 
company got under way. Burdened by suits for wrongful death and 
personal injuries, RJR became a target not only of class action law-
yers, but also of legislative committees, prosecutors, and investiga-
tive journalists. Their combined researches eventually revealed that 
the company had been lying for decades.10 RJR had been lying 
about the hazards of cigarette smoking. It had lied about the 
healthfulness of filtered cigarettes and of mentholated cigarettes. 
It was lying about addiction. As its troubles multiplied, the compa-
ny began moving deliberately to make its cigarettes even more ad-
dictive, and lying about those efforts. Ultimately, RJR was working 
hard to entice children, efforts that became more zealous over 
time.11
The company’s problems were compounded by its manage-
ment’s efforts to overcome them. There was a flurry of spin-offs 
and leveraged mergers and acquisitions. RJR became a conglomer-
ate, an owner not only of tobacco companies like Brown & Wil-
liamson, but also, most prominently, of Nabisco, formerly the Na-
tional Biscuit Company, particularly valued for its popular Oreo 
cookies. In RJR’s atmosphere of moral degradation, some of its ex-
ecutives sought to profit personally from these maneuvers, engag-
ing in insider trading. Some were systematically looting the com-
pany through bloated compensation packages and perquisites. All 
this left the American tobacco giant crippled.12
                                                   
 8. See, e.g., H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) (RICO 
action against a telephone company for injunctive relief); Republic of Iraq v. Abb AG, 768 
F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2014) (including a RICO action by a foreign sovereign). 
 9. For RJR’s own account of its history, see R. J. Reynolds Tobacco, A Look into Our Past,
https://www.rjrt.com/transforming-tobacco/history/. 
 10. See generally, e.g., PETER PRINGLE, CORNERED: BIG TOBACCO AT THE BAR Of JUSTICE 
(2014); MICHAEL RABINOFF, ENDING THE TOBACCO HOLOCAUST: HOW BIG TOBACCO AFFECTS 
OUR HEALTH, POCKETBOOK AND POLITICAL FREEDOM—AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT
(2010); MARK WOLFSON, THE FIGHT AGAINST BIG TOBACCO: THE MOVEMENT, THE STATE AND 
THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH (2001). 
 11. See generally, e.g., BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE
FALL OF RJR-NABISCO (1990); Report, “Camel Cigarettes: A Long History of Targeting Camels 
to Kids,” https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/microsites/camel/Camel_History.pdf. 
 12. Floyd Norris, Fund Books Loss on RJR After 15 years: A Long Chapter Ends for Kohlberg 
Kravis, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2004, at B1 (reporting that “[t]he greatest leveraged buyout ever is 
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The case that is the focus of these pages began back in 2001, in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York. This was an action brought by the European Community, 
representing twenty-six member countries.13 According to the 
Community’s complexly pleaded complaint—amended and re-
amended as the litigation wore on—RJR-Nabisco was the instigator, 
supervisor, leading actor, and chief beneficiary of a circular four-
way trade involving narcotics, support of terrorism, money laun-
dering, and black marketeering.14 If we focus on the primary alle-
gations, taking them as true, we can glimpse the main outlines of 
the scheme. 
To begin with, narcotics were obtained by RJR-Nabisco for ex-
port to Europe, largely through Colombian intermediaries. The 
narcotics were then shipped from South America through the 
Panama Canal with a cargo of RJR-Nabisco’s Camel cigarettes. This 
route was chosen to insulate the narcotics in the cargo from scruti-
ny at a U.S. port. The narcotics and the Camels would be made 
available on Europe’s black markets. (Cigarettes can be heavily 
regulated in European countries, with the result that in those 
countries there are profitable black markets for cigarettes. Camel 
cigarettes are favored by European smokers for their combination 
of Turkish and American tobaccos.) European customers for the 
narcotics or cigarettes paid for them with euros. Some of these eu-
ros were used, with the assistance of Russian intermediaries, to buy 
Turkish tobacco and additional supplies of narcotics from terrorist 
groups. The foreign black marketers and other conspirators openly 
exchanged these euros for dollars. The Turkish tobacco was 
shipped to RJR in North Carolina. After the various foreign agents 
took their respective cuts in euros or dollars the remaining freshly-
laundered dollars were exported to RJR in payment, and the cycle 
would recommence. This is just one understanding of the com-
plaint, but it suffices to convey the general nature of the alleged 
enterprise.15
                                                   
ending, not with a bang but with a whimper of loss. After 15 years of scrambling and pain, 
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts is through with its investment in RJR-Nabisco.”); Constance L. 
Hays, The Overview, End of an Empire: RJR-Nabisco Splits Tobacco Ventures and Food Business, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 10, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/?1999/03/10/?business/end-empire-
overview-rjr-nabisco-splits-tobacco-ventures-food-business.html. 
 13. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). The Eu-
ropean Community was one of three European trade organizations. In 2009, it was absorbed 
by the European Union. See Matthew J. Gabel, European Community, BRITANNICA 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Community-European-
economic-?association. 
 14. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 764 F.3d 129, 133–34 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 15. The complaint also alleged that RJR-Nabisco’s employees would take monthly trips 
from the United States to Colombia through Venezuela, bribe border guards in order to 
enter Colombia illegally, receive payments there, travel back to Venezuela, and wire the 
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In conducting these operations, RJR was allegedly acting in vio-
lation of RICO, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act.16 The lawsuit in federal District Court in Brooklyn was a 
“Civil RICO” action.17 Both civil and criminal liabilities under 
RICO require that a defendant enterprise engage in a pattern of 
violations18 of enumerated predicate crimes.19 A pattern of viola-
tions is properly pleaded if at least two predicate criminal viola-
tions are alleged.20
RJR-Nabisco was allegedly committing several predicate crimes, 
including mail fraud,21 support of terrorism,22 money laundering,23
and violations of the Travel Act.24
The complaint pleaded injuries to and within the twenty-six 
countries represented by the plaintiff European Community. But 
there were also allegations of American domestic injuries. Perhaps 
the European Community pleaded American injuries to help the 
District Court to see the defendant’s conduct as evoking the na-
                                                   
funds to RJR’s accounts in the United States; that RJR’s employees filed fraudulent docu-
ments with the U.S. Customs Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to 
further the scheme; and that RJR acquired Brown & Williamson Tobacco for the purpose of 
expanding its illegal activities. Apparently, the business of money-laundering in support of 
terrorism generally follows the trade routes outlined here and in the text, with the participa-
tion of Colombians and Russians. Cf. U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, Drug Trafficking and the 
Financing of Terrorism, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/drug-trafficking-and-
the-financing-of-terrorism.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2019) (noting that “drug trafficking has 
provided funding for insurgent groups in various regions throughout the world”). 
 16. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (1988). 
 17. RICO creates a private civil cause of action available to “[a]ny person injured in his 
business or property by reason of a violation” of its prohibitions. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012). 
Jurisdiction is vested in the federal district courts. Plaintiffs may recover treble damages, 
costs, and attorney’s fees. These remedies are modeled on the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–
27 (2012), which, in addition to furnishing additional substantive provisions to flesh out the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, provides rights to sue, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012) (at law); id. at § 15 
(remedies, including treble damages, fees, and costs); id. at § 26 (injunction). 
 18. RICO’s prohibition of “pattern[s] of racketeering activity” is set out at 18 U.S.C. § 
1962, and a pattern of racketeering activity is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) as the commit-
ting of two or more predicate crimes within a ten-year period. 
 19. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1), 1961(5), 1962(c). 
 20. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). 
 21. 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 
 22. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (2001). The Patriot Act was enacted in response to the Islamic terror attacks on the 
United States of September 11, 2001, by four passenger jets hijacked by Saudi individuals 
working out of Hamburg. Two of the hijacked jets flew into the twin skyscraper towers of the 
World Trade Center, causing their burning and collapse and ultimately obliterating a large 
part of lower Manhattan, the city’s financial district, including seven office buildings and a 
subway station. A third hijacked jet destroyed a part of the Pentagon, near Washington, 
D.C., in Virginia. A fourth hijacked jet, believed to be on course to crash into the Capitol, 
was brought down in Pennsylvania by its heroic passengers. These attacks killed some 3,000 
individuals in addition to the hundreds of hijacked passengers. 
 23. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2012). 
 24. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2012) (prohibiting use of the U.S. mails or any means of inter-
state or international travel in furtherance of criminal activity). 
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tional interests underlying RICO. But the Europeans waived those 
domestic American claims, perhaps doubting their standing to 
raise them. This put District Judge Garaufis in position to throw 
the foreign violations out with the domestic ones—which he did, 
on grounds of extraterritoriality.25 (This waiver also put the Su-
preme Court in the same position. It, too, would throw out the 
same baby with the same bathwater.26) Judge Garaufis could cite in 
support of the dismissal the emerging “new territorialism” of the 
Supreme Court.27
B. A Problematic Presumption 
The “new territorialism” appears to be the old territorialism, su-
perimposed belatedly on subjects previously not understood to be 
strictly under such constraint. The traditional American territorial-
ist view, at its most problematic, was a conviction that the Constitu-
tion of the United States had no bearing on the conduct of federal 
officials beyond our borders; nor did the United States have any 
interest in the effects of a federal official’s misconduct as experi-
enced beyond our borders.28 This, notwithstanding the lack of any 
                                                   
 25. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 26. RJR Nabisco v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2111 (2016). 
 27. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (interpreting the Al-
ien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)); Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 
247 (2010) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78(a) (fraud in the purchase and 
sale of securities)). For commentary, see generally “Symposium on Extraterritoriality,” 99 
CORNELL L. REV. (2014), with articles by John Coffee, Anthony Colangelo, Eugene Konto-
rovich, Jenny Martinez, Gerald Neuman, Louise Weinberg, and Juliet Moringiello & William 
Reynolds. 
 28. The supposed inability of American courts to apply the Constitution beyond our 
borders is often traced to The Insular Cases (Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); 
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Balzac v. 
Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)). But the individual holdings in these cases do not seem to 
support the assertion particularly well. Downes, for example, held that the transaction at is-
sue did not come within the relevant constitutional language. Balzac did hold that the Sixth 
Amendment did not apply in Puerto Rico, but that is a position that might be different to-
day. Modern discussions can be more contextual than territorial, involving the question 
whether there are “substantial connections” with the United States. See United States v. Ver-
dugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990). On the general question of the extraterritoriality 
of the Constitution in our own time, see Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritoriality and the Interest of 
the United States in Regulating Its Own, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1441 (2014) (commenting on 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)). In this impressive paper, Professor Neuman 
suggests grounds for optimism that Boumediene put a significant crimp in our newly-revived 
territorialism, since the case extended the protection of the Constitution to territory in Cu-
ba. But Boumediene seems too easy a case for optimism, since the detention facilities at Guan-
tanamo Bay are under the custody and control of the United States. To some extent this 
feature of control is shared by the border gulch involved in the cross-border shooting case 
of Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017), on remand, 869 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. 
granted, 139 S. Ct. 2636 (2019), discussed infra note 29. I should add that I share Professor 
Neuman’s conviction that federal officials must act constitutionally wherever they act. There 
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legitimate national interest in licensing our officials to behave bad-
ly when overseas, and notwithstanding our actual interests in repu-
tation, honor, dignity, reliability, and the esteem these intangible 
characteristics foster. Territorialism at that extreme had been a 
mistake, as the Supreme Court seems to know, but one that the 
Court seems reluctant to correct.29
In its current form, territorialism, at best, reflects a belief that 
the United States exhibits a courteous attention to the comity of 
nations by declining to interfere with a foreign sovereign’s control 
over events occurring within that sovereign’s own borders. This pol-
itesse can take many forms, but latterly appears in a hoary canon of 
statutory construction, an old rule that, in the silence of Congress 
about the territorial scope of a statute, the statute is presumed to 
have domestic application only.30 That is the rule lately revived and 
inserted into securities fraud cases in Morrison v. Bank of Australia.31
That is the rule recently extended to transnational human rights 
litigation under the Alien Tort Statute in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro-
leum Co.32 The presumption against extraterritorial application of 
                                                   
is an obvious parallel between Professor Neuman’s position vis-à-vis American officials to the 
position taken in this paper vis-à-vis American companies and their officials.
 29. See the punt by the United States Supreme Court in Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 
2003 (2017), on remand, 869 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2636 (2019). In 
Mesa, a federal border patrol agent standing on American soil fired two shots at a Mexican 
boy cowering behind a column on Mexican soil, killing the boy. In oral argument in the Su-
preme Court, Justice Sotomayor protested, “Wouldn’t shooting potshots at Mexican citizens 
be shocking to the conscience?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 
S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (No. 15-118). In that initial round, the Supreme Court was evidently too 
embarrassed to deny extraterritorial constitutional duties on the part of United States offi-
cials, or to view the border gulch, wholly under United States control, as extraterritorial. 
Instead, the Court remanded to the Fifth Circuit to determine whether special factors coun-
seled hesitation vis-à-vis the availability of a Bivens claim for damages. The Court of Appeals 
dutifully found that special factors counseled hesitation. Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811 
(5th Cir. 2018). Predictably, the arguments deployed in the Fifth Circuit on remand were 
irrational. For example, potential harm in our “foreign affairs” was held to be a special fac-
tor counseling hesitation, although Mexico will be offended by the denial of relief to the 
grieving Mexican family. 885 F.3d, at 819; see of the Government of the United Mexican 
States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners, Hernandez v. Mesa, No. 17-1678 (July 
20, 2018); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hernandez v. Mesa, No. 17-1678 (June 15, 
2018) (noting the irrationality of the foreign relations argument). The parents again peti-
tioned the Supreme Court for review. Certiorari was granted to decide the question of 
whether a Bivens action will ever be available for a plausibly pleaded violation of clearly es-
tablished law by a rogue federal official. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 139 S. Ct. 2636 (2019). The 
case was argued November 12, 2019. 
 30. For thoughtful consideration of the territorial question in contracts cases in both 
kinds of inter-sovereign litigation, see Hannah L. Buxbaum, Determining the Territorial Scope of 
State Law in Interstate and International Conflicts: Comments on the Draft Restatement (Third) and 
on the Role of Party Autonomy, 27 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 381 (2017). 
 31. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 32. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). Kiobel rendered the Al-
ien Tort Statute [ATS] a virtual nullity in the only cases for which it mattered, the case on 
wholly foreign facts, in effect deleting perhaps the greatest lower-court case in American 
legal history, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). In Filartiga, the Second Cir-
FALL 2019] Age of Unreason 13
law can be overcome, but according to Chief Justice Roberts, writ-
ing for the Court in Kiobel, only if a case “touches and concerns” 
the United States with “sufficient force” to overcome the presump-
tion.33 And now, just as the federal Courts of Appeals are struggling 
to define what “touches and concerns” the United States “with suf-
ficient force,” they must also struggle to identify a “focus.” Under 
Morrison, it appears that what “touches and concerns” must be a 
“focus” of the legislature’s own concern.34 But the Supreme Court 
has also looked to the “gravamen” of a complaint.35
                                                   
cuit held, by Judge Kaufman, that the perpetrator of foreign atrocities is hostis human generis,
the enemy of all mankind, and that it is in the “collective” interest of all nations to open 
their courts to civil suits against that enemy wherever found. Id. at 890. The transnational 
case is the only significant case under the ATS; our courts already have power, however lim-
ited, over violations of human rights occurring here and have no urgent need of Filartiga for 
domestic cases. See Louise Weinberg, What We Don’t Talk About When We Talk About Extraterri-
toriality: Kiobel and the Conflict of Laws, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1471 (2014). 
In Kiobel, Chief Justice Roberts explained that, because the ATS was a jurisdictional 
grant only, the question was whether claims thereunder could be extended extraterritorially. 
However, he did not explain why a presumption against extraterritorial application of legis-
lation could be relevant to the common law claim pleaded in Kiobel. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 115.
That was a cause of action made cognizable under the great case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala..
The supposition that the ATS is only jurisdictional probably derives in part from its being 
couched at its outset as a jurisdictional grant. But it is also easily read to provide a cause of 
action for which the jurisdiction is granted, an action “for a tort . . . in violation of the law of 
nations.” See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 
1350 (2012)) (“And be it further enacted, That the district courts shall have . . . cognizance, 
concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of 
all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States.”). But see Jara v. Núñez, 878 F.3d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 2018) (following 
the reasoning of the Supreme Court; ruling that the “focus” of the claim in the case was ex-
traterritorial and that therefore there was no jurisdiction). 
Occasionally a court can be found working around the Court’s demolition of the ATS, 
perhaps not very convincingly. To take a recent example, in Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 
1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2018), the Court of Appeals ruled that allegations of funding child slav-
ery in the Ivory Coast related to the required “focus,” and held (taking advantage of the Su-
preme Court’s not having determined whether aiding and abetting claims are cognizable 
under the ATS), that the plaintiffs, former child slaves, could plead a cause of action under 
the ATS for aiding and abetting child slavery. The Ninth Circuit here was eliding the further 
question of corporate liability vel non, which had been decided in the negative a few months 
previously in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018), also arguably a case of sec-
ondary liability. 
 33. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124-25. 
 34. See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010) (stating that 
there was nothing in the “focus” of the securities fraud section of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 to suggest a national interest in regulating foreign exchanges); 15 U.S.C. § 
78(a); 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2018) (civil liability for fraud in the purchase and sale of securi-
ties). 
For an interesting recent case converting the “focus” test into a modified interest analy-
sis, see In re Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, 917 F.3d 85 (2d 
Cir. 2019) (ruling that the “focus” question was whether the relevant transfers were suffi-
ciently domestic to warrant application of our law, and that the United States’ interest in 
applying its law to disputes arising out of a fraudulent transfer of funds from the Madoff 
debtor’s United States bank accounts in furtherance of a massive Ponzi scheme orchestrated 
by him outweighed the interest of any foreign state). 
 35. OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 136 S. Ct. 390, 394–95 (2015) (holding that an 
American woman who purchased a Eurail pass passenger ticket in the United States, but fell 
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In RJR-Nabisco, the Second Circuit cut this Gordian knot. The 
court simply found the extraterritoriality argument altogether un-
convincing, without regard to any of these niceties. Abstract 
“rules,” “tests,” “doctrines,” and the like, superimposed on a real 
problem, will not necessarily provide real understanding of that 
problem or rational solutions for it. The Second Circuit panel va-
cated the District Court’s judgment of dismissal and remanded.36
Judge Leval, concurring, pointed out that a RICO defendant must 
have committed predicate offenses. Otherwise no Civil RICO ac-
tion could lie. And as to each of RJR-Nabisco’s alleged predicate 
offenses, Congress had clearly manifested its intention that the leg-
islation apply extraterritorially.37 The explicit extraterritoriality of 
all of RJR-Nabisco’s particular predicate violations made Con-
gress’s purposes quite clear.38 The Second Circuit denied rehearing 
en banc.39 In my view Judge Leval was right. I venture to add that the 
regulatory interests underlying the statute could not rationally be 
limited to our borders.40
The Supreme Court reversed.41 The Court held, by Justice Alito 
(four to three42), that Civil RICO could not ground an otherwise 
proper action when the damages complained of were incurred 
abroad.43
C. The Struggle for Reason 
On these facts my adroit reader has already predicted that, in 
RJR-Nabisco, Justice Alito would have had to struggle to find plausi-
ble reasons to support his insistence, for any recovery, that the in-
juries alleged be domestic. Let us consider six key aspects of that 
territorialist struggle. 
(1) Foreign relations and extraterritoriality. Justice Alito’s least per-
suasive attempt to support the Court’s ruling may have been his 
                                                   
between platform and train on an Austrian railway, could not sue, the “gravamen” of her 
complaint having to do with her injury abroad, rather than her contract here). 
 36. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, 764 F.3d 129, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 37. Id. at 134. 
 38. The anti-terror and money laundering predicates at issue were part of the USA Pa-
triot Act of 2001, enacted in response to the 9/11 attacks on this country, supra note 22. 
 39. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, 783 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 40. For the rational reach of regulatory law, see infra Parts I-D, II-D, III-B. 
 41. RJR Nabisco v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2111 (2016). For recent 
commentary on RJR-Nabisco, see supra note 4. 
 42. Justice Sotomayor did not take part, and there was also the seat left vacant by Justice 
Scalia’s death. Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court was joined by the Chief Justice and Jus-
tices Kennedy and Thomas. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined Alito’s opinion as 
to Parts I, II, and III, and dissented from the remainder and the judgment. 
 43. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2111. 
FALL 2019] Age of Unreason 15
argument that permitting application of Civil RICO to foreign 
events would produce “friction” in our foreign relations. As Justice 
Alito put this, “[P]roviding a private civil remedy for foreign con-
duct creates a potential for international friction . . . .”44
Thus Justice Alito began his fall down the rabbit hole of unrea-
son. Even if his point about “friction” in our international relations 
were not a speculation about a potential problem in some other 
case in the future, an observer might well find irrational the fear 
that some day a foreign country might be offended by making an 
American malefactor pay damages to it. Justice Alito found votes 
for this position, but the reader, I think, can see here the souring 
of common defenses that occasioned this paper. 
Nevertheless, let us take this concern about “friction” seriously. 
We can say that it rests on the reasonable view that every sovereign 
has its own mode of redress for injuries, and no sovereign should 
be expected to suffer gladly what amounts to a denigration of its 
own control over events within its own borders. So far, so good. But 
RJR-Nabisco falls into irrationality when the Court asks us to believe 
that foreign countries, themselves seeking justice under an act of 
Congress, will be content only if we show them the door.45
Thus it was that, having bracingly reminded us that “We cannot 
rule the world,”46 Justice Alito wound up declining to rule a com-
pany in North Carolina. 
(2) Foreign relations and delicate balances. In a recent case involving 
American parties and an injury occurring in Mexico, Judge Posner 
voiced similar trepidations,47 particularly when it comes to damag-
es. Posner suggested that the generosity of American recoveries 
could be inappropriate when measured against the standards of 
under-developed countries.48
This problem of over-generosity and under-development was a 
particular concern of Justice Alito in RJR-Nabisco. “Even when for-
eign countries permit private rights of action,” he wrote, “they of-
ten have different schemes for litigating them and may approve of 
different measures of damages. Allowing [foreigners] to pursue 
private suits in the United States [might] upset that delicate bal-
ance and offend the sovereign interests of foreign nations.”49
                                                   
 44. Id. at 2106. 
 45. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hernandez v. Mesa, No. 17-1678, supra note 
29.
 46. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct., at 2100 (citing Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 
454 (2007)). 
 47. Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 48. Id.
 49. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106-07. 
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Here we see the hazards of applying abstract reasoning to real 
facts. Justice Alito, although vaguely referring to “foreigners” who 
choose to pursue their litigation here, was really concerned about 
a foreign defendant, because the defendant, a foreign company, is 
the party that Alito was imagining might be required to pay dam-
ages on a scale out of proportion with customary damages in its 
own country. Who is this defendant company, hailing from an un-
der-developed country, a company that can be sued here, and one 
that is unfairly surprised by a trebling of damages? (This is hardly 
the case the Court was called upon to decide, but let us deal with it 
as if it were.) We can see at once that this third-world defendant is 
a chimera. A third-world company will not be amenable to suit 
here unless it is “at home” here.50 A company sophisticated enough 
to be at home in the United States and sufficiently sophisticated to 
be doing business here—and sufficiently successful to be worth su-
ing—is sophisticated enough to have a lawyer and to know that it is 
under a duty to conform to American law. This company is not 
surprised by treble damages. 
Moreover, the damages that Justice Alito was worried about tre-
bling are very different from the real-life damages this mythical 
third world company might actually be called upon to pay. Under 
Civil RICO, damages are simply actual economic damages.51 In 
other words, these are damages sustained at that foreign place at 
the relevant time.52
To be sure, these are to be trebled, and this led Justice Alito to 
reason, from the conjecturally more limited remedies available 
under foreign law, that Congress’s provision of treble damages 
should not govern the case before him. However, there was no for-
eign defendant in RJR-Nabisco to protect from American treble 
damages. The argument had no rational application in a case 
against an American company making and selling its products 
here.
In the face of such verities, Justice Alito doubled down. Glimps-
ing the irrationality of the argument about treble damages levied 
                                                   
 50. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014) (holding, in pertinent part, 
that a company must be “at home” at the forum attempting to assert general jurisdiction 
over it, with the implication that the forum must be the place of incorporation or a principal 
place of business). 
 51. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (“Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a vio-
lation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States dis-
trict court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, in-
cluding a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 52. See Guinness v. Miller, 291 F. 769 (S.D.N.Y 1923) (Hand, L.: “The form of the obli-
gation must therefore be to indemnify the victim for his loss in terms of the money of the 
foreign sovereign, and that obligation necessarily speaks as of the time when it arose; that is, 
when the loss occurred.”). 
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on foreigners, he fell back on the speculation that the need to re-
spect delicate balances in foreign law would be more pressing in 
other cases, and therefore should simply be applied in all cases. And 
in doing so he pasted over his inapposite concern for foreign de-
fendants under a very different, and apposite, concern for foreign 
plaintiffs:
Respondents urge that concerns about international fric-
tion are inapplicable in this case because here the plaintiffs 
are not foreign citizens seeking to bypass their home coun-
tries’ less generous remedies but rather the foreign coun-
tries themselves . . . . . Even assuming that this is true, how-
ever, . . . [w]e reject the notion that we should forgo the 
presumption against extraterritoriality and instead permit 
extraterritorial suits based on a case-by-case inquiry . . . . Ra-
ther than guess anew in each case, we apply the presump-
tion in all cases . . . .53
Justice Alito continued, “Respondents suggest that we should . . . 
discard [our] reservations when a foreign state sues a U.S. entity in 
this country under U.S. law—instead of in its own courts and un-
der its own laws—for conduct committed on its own soil. We refuse 
to adopt this double standard.”54 He concluded, “Although ‘a risk 
of conflict between the American statute and a foreign law’ is not a 
prerequisite for applying the presumption against extraterritoriali-
ty, where such a risk is evident, the need to enforce the presump-
tion is at its apex.”55 Yet there was no such risk—and, indeed, no 
conflict—in the case. All these countries were in perfect agreement 
with our law and sought its benefit. 
In my view, RJR-Nabisco, a sophisticated but predatory American 
company, if in violation of RICO, richly deserved the purely eco-
nomic penalty Congress provided for a pattern of violations of our 
laws. With treble damages, Congress struck its own balance be-
tween too low a penalty on the one hand, and jury-awarded puni-
tive damages on the other. 
(3) The text and the territorial presumption. Justice Alito soldiered 
on, figuratively shrugging off what must have been, to him, a sur-
                                                   
 53. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2108. The reader may note Justice Alito’s hostility to the 
forum-shopping plaintiffs. In my view, it is a court’s hostility to a nonresident that presents a 
problem, not the nonresident who seeks justice where it is available. In RJR itself, the forum 
was particularly suited to a case brought by a multi-membered plaintiff class alleging a series 
of complex international transactions. The federal district court in the Eastern District of 
New York is renowned for its competence in complex cases. 
 54. Id.
 55. Id. at 2107. 
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prising unsuitability of anything he could think of to say in support 
of his concerns about foreign relations, damages, and delicate bal-
ances. He turned, like a drowning man sighting terra firma, to a 
close reading of statutory text. 
For some years it has seemed that both in the academy and in 
the courts, “we are all textualists now.”56 But Justice Alito encoun-
tered some difficulty in attempting to find a textual reason for 
reading a territorial limit into a regulatory statute that does not 
contain one. 
We can say of RICO, at the very least, that Congress’s intention 
in RICO is regulatory. Congress intends to regulate rackets and 
racketeering. As to that regulatory intention, in a case against 
American racketeers, it could not matter where the criminal activi-
ties or the injuries consequent upon them occurred.57 “Thou shalt 
not kill” is a command that does not vary depending upon the lo-
cation of the killing.58
But in RICO, Congress did not rely solely upon the natural 
reach of regulatory law, but went out of its way, in addition, and 
repeatedly, to make its extraterritorial intentions explicit in every 
predicate relevant to the case. Justice Alito had to acknowledge 
that Congress had given RICO extraterritorial scope. As he put 
this, “[I]t is hard to imagine how Congress could have more clearly 
                                                   
 56. Elena Kagan, “The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the 
Reading of Statutes” (Harvard Law School, Nov. 18, 2015) (“We’re all textualists now.”). But 
see infra note 98 and accompanying text for the insight of the American legal realists that law 
cannot be construed rationally in disregard of its purposes. Although textualists have little 
use for purposive reasoning, and clearly have prevailed, it seems obvious that it makes no 
sense to construe a piece of text, much less an omission, in a way that defeats its purposes. 
For this reason, other features of statutory constructions discounted by textualists, such as 
the historical context at the time of enactment, can be very helpful. For an excruciating ex-
ample of irrational and unjust textualism, see Astrue v. Capato, 566 U.S. 541 (2012) (Gins-
burg, J., for a unanimous Court, interpreting five words, “For purposes of this Chapter,” to 
strip dependent twin infants of their Social Security support, because they were conceived in 
vitro and posthumously born, and the state in which their wage-earner father died domiciled 
would not permit posthumous children to inherit). By failing to respect the purposes of So-
cial Security, enacted in response to the Great Depression, the Court managed to impover-
ish an entire family of six dependents, who thereafter, of course, would have had to share 
their own modest support with the unsupported twins. See Louise Weinberg, A General Theory 
of Governance: Due Process and Lawmaking Power, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1057, 1107–14 
(2013).
 57. Cf. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW INST., Council 
Draft No. 3) at § xv. 
 58. I note, however, that in a prosecution here of foreign racketeers, domestic injury 
would probably have to be pleaded to provide a nexus with the case—a basis for an Ameri-
can court’s assertion of jurisdiction. A taking of jurisdiction, like all government action, re-
quires some legitimate governmental interest on the part of the government involved—the 
“rational basis” on which due process depends. Governmental interests, the Supreme Court 
has held, are generated by a “contact” or “contacts” between the particular case and the re-
spective government such that application of that interested government’s law is rational 
and not unfair. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981)). 
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indicated that it intended RICO to have extraterritorial effect. [Its] 
unique structure makes RICO the rare statute that clearly evidenc-
es extraterritorial effect despite lacking an express statement of ex-
traterritoriality.”59
Struggling against this, Justice Alito pitched on the unlikely ex-
pedient of reading the two parallel sets of text, civil and criminal, 
under two different standards. All that intention and structure and 
meaning could be attributed to Criminal RICO. RJR-Nabisco’s 
crimes could be prosecuted, given the explicit extraterritorial scope 
of each predicate crime at issue in RJR-Nabisco, as well as the im-
plicit extraterritorial reach Justice Alito could not help seeing in 
RICO overall. But, he pointed out, Civil RICO contains no state-
ment of its own about extraterritorial scope. (Neither does crimi-
nal RICO.) 
So it was that Justice Alito went on to hold, for the Court, that 
the statute’s failure to be explicit about extraterritorial application 
on its civil side, unlike its equal failure on its criminal side, was fatal 
to civil enforcement in the absence of domestic injury. And so Civil 
RICO was held to be a virtual nullity in international litigation.60
The interpretation of a legislative omission is bound to be 
somewhat tenuous. Yet the presumption against extraterritorial 
application, of course, itself depends on an omission. The canon 
against extraterritoriality arises only in the silence of Congress, and 
thus amounts, ironically, to a non-textual insistence on text. Omis-
sions can be intentional, of course, but how can we tell whether 
they are intentional or not? Justice Alito thought the omission in-
tentional for Civil RICO, but thought the same omission was in-
tended to be of no consequence in construing Criminal RICO. 
The question for us is whether a statute concededly instinct with 
extraterritorial intention61 can rationally ground an interpretation 
that renders the statute inoperative to remedy foreign injuries in 
lawsuits by foreign friends against Americans—but not in prosecu-
tions of Americans for the same foreign injuries. The answer would 
appear to be, “No,” and there is very little in the Court’s opinion 
that gets us over this reality. 
                                                   
 59. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2103. 
 60. For a similar position in a state court, see the dictum in McCann v. Foster Wheeler 
LLC, 225 P.3d 516 (Cal. 2010) (decreeing that thenceforth California would remedy only 
those toxic tort claims arising in California, whether or not the plaintiff is a Californian, thus 
furnishing a haven for California “toxic” tortfeasors who cause injuries anywhere else, and 
forcing injured Californians in toxic tort cases “arising” elsewhere to have to look to courts 
away from home for justice, although the general rule is that the plaintiff who can obtain 
jurisdiction over the defendant can always sue at home).
 61. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2103 (“[I]t is hard to imagine how Congress could have 
more clearly indicated that it intended RICO to have (some) extraterritorial effect.”).
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Indeed, it is bound to be hard to erase any statutory text in the 
interest of textualism. It is hard to erase from RICO such features 
as its declaration of the scope of Congress’s power under the Con-
stitution. That appears in Congress’s definition of a Civil RICO de-
fendant; the statute explicitly covers every defendant enterprise 
which is “engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or 
foreign commerce.”62 As for plaintiffs, the statute is equally explicit 
that its civil remedy is for the use of “[a]ny person injured in his 
business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962.”63 And 
Congress explicitly mandated that the statute be given a liberal 
construction.64 In light of these mandates, why was not the explicit 
extraterritorial reach of each alleged predicate violation sufficient? 
In fact, it is. Those violations were essential allegations of a Civil 
RICO complaint, as Judge Leval, concurring, pointed out below.65
The reader will recall that Civil RICO, like Criminal RICO, is read 
to require allegations of violation of at least two predicate criminal 
laws, and that each of the predicates involved in this case is explic-
itly extraterritorial in scope.66
Then, too, there is the bearing of terrorism. In the wake of 9/11, 
the Patriot Act added additional crimes to the list of RICO predi-
cates, mainly money-laundering offenses abroad in support of ter-
rorism,67 which were among those at issue in RJR-Nabisco. With re-
spect to that foreign conduct, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out, 
dissenting from the judgment, it would be inappropriate to impose 
any rule of construction which would limit “foreign allies’ access to 
our courts to battle against money laundering.”68 Ginsburg also ar-
gued that Civil RICO, being a wholesale incorporation of RICO, 
incorporates its extraterritoriality.69 “RICO’s private right of ac-
tion . . . expressly incorporates § 1962,” she wrote, “whose extrater-
ritoriality, the Court recognizes, is coextensive with the underlying 
predicate offenses charged.”70 It appears that the textual defense in 
RJR-Nabisco made as little sense as might have been expected in 
cases in our configuration.71
                                                   
 62. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012). 
 63. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012). 
 64. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012) (“The provisions of [RICO] shall be liberally construed to 
effectuate its remedial purposes.”). 
 65. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 764 F.3d 129, 136-37 (2d. Cir. 2014). 
 66. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (defining a “pattern” of activity). 
 67. Id.
 68. RJR Nabisco v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2113, 2117 n.3 (2016) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). 
 69. Id. at 2113. 
 70. Id.
 71. In stressing the need for repeated statutory mention of extraterritoriality, albeit 
only in the context of civil suit, Justice Alito displayed the inconsistency required to avoid 
judicial obliteration of RICO in cases of transnational misconduct with an American nexus. 
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A most versatile omission, this failure to re-state the obvious. It is 
an omission that, according to Justice Alito, would not “count” in a 
prosecution of RJR-Nabisco, but one which annihilates a civil claim 
against RJR-Nabisco on identical facts. Justice Alito wrote: “[W]e 
separately apply the presumption against extraterritoriality to 
RICO’s cause of action despite our conclusion that the presump-
tion has been overcome with respect to RICO’s substantive prohi-
bitions.”72 How can this be a principled textualism, when it relies 
not only on what it calls an omission, but on a conveniently variable
reading of that omission? 
And so, ironically, in RJR-Nabisco, a textualist judge and his tex-
tualist majority bowed to a supposed duty to disregard the 
acknowledged purposes of an act of Congress, subordinating the 
statute to a late blooming judicially created hurdle that Congress 
had no way of predicting. Far from engaging in statutory construc-
tion, this textualist Court elevated a supposed statutory silence to 
eviscerate the actual text of an act of Congress. 
Thinking about all this, we can begin to see that the textualist 
argument, at least in this case, an argument supposedly in the ser-
vice of deference to the legislature and separation of powers, in 
fact thumbs its figurative nose at the legislature, and, through what 
we might call the “gotcha” theory of statutory interpretation, works 
very hard, perversely, to frustrate a legislature’s purposes. 
(4) The private right to sue. But Alito’s most curious venture into 
unreason in RJR-Nabisco was to associate each of the foregoing ar-
guments with an overarching argument, that Congress should not 
authorize private rights to sue,73 at least in cases of injury abroad. 
(He could hardly argue that Congress could not do so.) For Justice 
Alito, this was the key question posed by the case—the question 
whether “RICO’s private right of action, contained in § 1964(c), 
appl[ies] to injuries that are suffered in foreign countries.”74 Is 
there any good reason why the answer to this question, about a 
statute concededly instinct with extraterritorial intent, should be 
“no?” Yet, Alito mused, “[i]t is not enough to say that a private 
right of action must reach abroad because the underlying law gov-
                                                   
Less importantly, he also displayed a rather optimistic assessment of the legislative process. 
No member of Congress sits down and writes a bill. The drafting of legislation is commonly 
done in committee, by aides in the offices of the respective members. And no member of 
Congress can read through every word in every bill. As Nancy Pelosi is said to have remarked 
about the Affordable Care Act, “We have to enact it to find out what’s in it.” Dan Macguill, 
Did Nancy Pelosi Say Obamacare Must be Passed to ‘Find Out What Is in It’?, SNOPES (June 22, 
2017), https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/pelosi-healthcare-pass-the-bill-to-see-what-is-in-
it/. 
 72. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106. 
 73. Id. at 2091; 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 
 74. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2119. 
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erns conduct in foreign countries. Something more is need-
ed . . . .”75 The reader, perhaps, may be forgiven for asking, 
“Why?”76
Justice Alito went so far as to set it down that “[t]he creation of a 
private right of action raises issues beyond the mere consideration 
whether underlying primary conduct should be allowed or 
not . . . .”77 Again, the reader will be forgiven for asking, “Why?” 
What is happening here is an unprecedented inapposite transfer 
of a whole sphere of argumentation from one area of law to anoth-
er.
The conservative wing of the Supreme Court has long exhibited 
what might justly be perceived as hostility to civil litigation alto-
gether.78 It is as though the Court would prefer to be a court of 
criminal appeals. A special butt of the Justices, as far back as the 
days of the late Burger Court,79 has been the so-called “implied” 
private right to sue to enforce an act of Congress. This is not only 
because an implied right, by definition, is not express. The prob-
lem for the Court has been that, if Congress has not provided a 
right to sue, the litigation of a statutory violation is authorized only 
by federal common law.80 And as everybody (still!) thinks he knows, 
there is supposed to be something not quite right about federal 
common law81—some emanation, perhaps, of Erie,82 or of the Rules 
of Decision Act.83
                                                   
 75. Id. at 2108. 
 76. Cf. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2016, 65 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1, 5 (2017) (pointing out that in RJR Nabisco, “the Supreme Court stretched the 
presumption against extraterritoriality to the farthest extreme so far, by requiring courts to 
apply the presumption separately for each section of a statute”). 
 77. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106. 
 78. See Timothy P. Carney, Trial Lawyer Industry Tries to Buy a Democratic Majority, WASH.
EXAMINER MAG. (Oct. 22, 2014, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trial-
lawyer-industry-tries-to-buy-a-democratic-majority; Leslie Wayne, Trial Lawyers Pour Money into 
Democrats’ Chests, N.Y. TIMES (March 23, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/23/us/
trial-lawyers-pour-money-into-democrats-chests.html. 
 79. See, e.g., Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 
(1981) (holding that there can be no implied cause of action for interstate water pollution 
either under the Clean Water Act or the Civil Rights Act); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. 
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (holding that there can be no implied cause of action un-
der an act of Congress regulating conditions in certain caretaker institutions). 
 80. It has been argued that private rights to sue make more business for the plaintiffs’ 
trial bar, which, through its professional association is widely believed to give monetary sup-
port to the Democratic Party. See, e.g., Adam Bonica, Adam S. Chilton & Maya Seny, The Po-
litical Ideologies of American Lawyers, 8 J. LEG. ANAL. 277, 281 (2016); Wayne, Trial Lawyers, su-
pra note 78. 
 81. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 
1034 (1982) (referring to “the constraints imposed on federal common law by Erie and its 
progeny”); Martin Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process: 
Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TULANE L. REV. 803, 809 (1994) 
(referring to “the ban in the Rules of Decision Act . . . on the creation of federal common 
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Under the influence of Justice (later Chief Justice) Rehnquist 
and Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court became increasingly averse 
to federal common-law actions to enforce acts of Congress.84 Judi-
cial creation of a private right to sue to enforce an act of Congress 
came to be regarded as a relic of the “heady days” when the Court 
was willing to permit it.85 Increasingly, only the clear intention of 
                                                   
law”). For a current example, finding problematic the realist acknowledgment that judges 
“make” law, see, e.g. Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 527, 528 (2019). 
The Court’s dislike of implied rights has been developing against a background of hos-
tility to federal common law altogether. For decades the Court has spent much of its energy 
in working up hostility to federal common lawmaking, as if that was not the very business the 
Justices were in. Yet judge-made constraints on judicial lawmaking are judicial lawmaking 
too. Moreover, the Court’s attack on federal common law ex ante, becomes, ex post, an irra-
tional attack on the Supreme Court’s own precedents. 
 82. But see Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805–52 (1989). 
There is no such emanation, of course. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie
held only that identified state law must apply in all courts when it applies. Justice Brandeis 
reasoned that there can be no “general” federal common law, that all law must be the law of 
an identified sovereign. In state-law cases, that sovereign is the state, and under Erie, state 
law (obviously) applies in all courts when it applies. Of course, in federal-law cases, that sov-
ereign is the nation, and under the Supremacy Clause federal law (obviously) applies in all 
courts when it applies. 
 83. But see Louise Weinberg, The Curious Notion that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Supreme 
Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 860–75 (1989). The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1652, provides, in its tautological obsolete way, “The laws of the several states, except 
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require 
or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United 
States, in cases where they apply.” This antique traces back 240 years to Section 34 of the 
First Judiciary Act of 1789 § 34 (“And be it further enacted, That the laws of the several 
states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise 
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the 
courts of the United States in cases where they apply.”). In practice, over the intervening 240 
years, judges in all courts have been quite able to decide federal questions within their juris-
diction, and are free, if they wish, to incorporate a state rule by reference if there is no 
strong national interest in the question. Similarly, over the intervening 240 years, judges in 
all courts have been quite able to decide state questions within their jurisdiction, subject to 
supreme federal law. 
 84. The Court’s distaste for implied statutory rights to sue has culminated, latterly, in 
such cases as Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017) (stating that further resort to the 
Bivens cause of action is a disfavored activity). Bivens is the only general damages remedy 
against a federal official for violation of the Constitution and federal laws. 
 85. Corr. Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to cre-
ate causes of action—decreeing them to be ‘implied’ by the mere existence of a statutory or 
constitutional prohibition. As the Court points out, we have abandoned that power to invent 
‘implications’ in the statutory field.”) (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 
(2001)). The Court increasingly reveals a dangerous disinclination to enforce the Constitu-
tion. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) is the common-law 
mechanism grounding actions against federal officials for civil rights violations, and thus is 
the federal-officer analog of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which grounded suit against state
officials for civil rights violations. Bivens is thus a lynchpin of American constitutionalism 
and the rule of law. One might suppose it sufficiently difficult for plaintiffs to recover dam-
ages in both kinds of civil rights actions to satisfy the Court’s distaste for them, since defend-
ant officials, federal and state, enjoy so-called official or qualified immunity from liability for 
violations of law “not clearly established.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
What is “clearly established” can seem to lie in the eyes of the beholder. See Kisela v. Hughes, 
138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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Congress, preferably in an express provision of a right to sue, will 
make an act of Congress enforceable in a lawsuit. 
In developing this body of law, the Court seems unaware of an 
obvious and basic proposition of tort law: that a tort caused by vio-
lation of a statute is far more serious than a tort caused by a breach of 
some general duty.86 Indeed, a tort in violation of a statute can be 
held to be negligence per se, or can result in a presumption of neg-
ligence, or shift the burden of proof of negligence. At the very 
least it can comprise competent evidence of negligence.87 Even at 
federal common law, in admiralty, a statutory violation88 is far more 
serious than some violation of a general duty. A statutory violation 
causing a collision, for example, shifts an extraordinary burden to 
the violating vessel to prove not only that its violation did not cause 
the collision, but also that it could not have done so.89 Given the 
naturally heightened importance of a tort when caused by violation 
of a statute, it is astonishing that the Court continues and even 
strengthens its steady assault on remedies for torts caused by viola-
tions of acts of Congress. 
But the most egregiously irrational feature of Justice Alito’s 
opinion in RJR-Nabisco was his treatment of RICO’s express private 
right to sue. In Alito’s hands—at least if extraterritoriality is an is-
sue—the express private right to sue fares no better than the “im-
plied” private right to sue upon which the Court has been heaping 
obloquy for so long. 
It makes no sense to say that an action can be permitted only 
with the greatest caution if the right to sue has not been given in a 
statute expressly, and then to say that a right that has been given in 
a statute expressly must also be permitted only with the greatest 
caution. That about covers all the ground, as far as cases of extra-
territoriality are concerned. Justice Alito was saying that even Con-
gress, hitherto the only proper lawgiver in conservatives’ eyes, can-
not, in international cases, be understood as a lawgiver at all, if it 
omits to repeat that it really means that what it has enacted with 
conceded extraterritorial intent is to be given extraterritorial ef-
fect. 
                                                   
 86. Cf. W. PAGE KEETON et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 230 (5th ed. 1984). 
 87. Id. at 230 (reviewing the alternatives; concluding that negligence per se is probably 
the majority rule). 
 88. The inland rules of navigation, for example, are codified. See 33 U.S.C § 2071–2073 
(2004).
 89. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125, 136 (1873) (“In such a case the burden rests upon 
the ship of showing not merely that her fault might not have been one of the causes, or that 
it probably was not, but that it could not have been. Such a rule is necessary to enforce obe-
dience to the mandate of the statute.”).
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But Justice Alito here became even more sweeping in his lan-
guage, and thus even more irrational. His broadened language 
could be read to disapprove of new classes of civil litigation alto-
gether. Quoting language from an earlier case, Justice Alito wrote, 
“‘The creation of a private right of action raises issues beyond the 
mere consideration whether underlying primary conduct should 
be allowed or not, entailing, for example, a decision to permit en-
forcement without the check imposed by prosecutorial discre-
tion.’”90
Justice Alito seems here to be arguing, in effect, that Congress 
meant to discourage altogether the use of the civil remedy that 
Congress itself enacted. 
Alito’s attempt to justify this bit of unreason only led him further 
down the rabbit hole. He did not attempt to explain why attorneys 
(who labor under a need to win cases to meet payroll and pay 
overhead—not to mention a need not to violate Rule 11) are not 
an effective “check” on private litigation. He also omitted to men-
tion that a prosecutor’s discretionary decision not to prosecute is 
unreviewable, so that in the absence of a private right to sue there 
may be no access to justice at all for victims of criminal activity vio-
lating an act of Congress. And if he intended this part of his opin-
ion to have to do exclusively with international cases, I should have 
thought the State Department to be more effective than local U.S. 
Attorneys in dealing with, or at least in informing courts of, foreign 
relations issues, if only because State Department officials are un-
der no pressure to secure convictions.91
(5) The law to be applied. An extraordinary rule was discovered 
and set out with approval by Justice Alito in RJR-Nabisco. He wrote, 
                                                   
 90. RJR Nabisco v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106 (2016) (quoting Sosa v. 
Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004)). 
 91. It is part of the complexity of the issues raised by RJR Nabisco that the European 
Community probably had few avenues for relief abroad. After the decision in RJR Nabisco,
the question arises whether the individual countries involved, or the European Union itself, 
was competent to do anything about the linked problems of terror, narcotics, and tobacco 
glimpsed in the RJR Nabisco litigation. See Anatole Abaquesne de Parfourus, “Breaking 
Through the Foul and Ugly Mists of Vapours”—Regulation of Alternative Tobacco and Related Prod-
ucts by the New TPD and Exercise of EU Competence, 19 GERMAN L.J. 1291 (2018). It is widely 
noted that civil litigation in European countries, unlike criminal prosecution, can be inex-
pedient and even unavailable. The courts often are not like common-law courts. Earlier cas-
es can appear as unexplained bald statements of decision. Contingency fees are often con-
sidered unethical, and the winner’s attorney fees tend to get shifted to the loser, thus 
impeding the kind of court access individuals enjoy in the United States. Moreover, courts 
may not have powers to handle class or other complex actions, or to provide court orders. A 
few European nations, inspired by our Supreme Court, have instituted constitutional courts, 
but these can suffer from some of the same sorts of impediments as do other courts in Eu-
ropean countries, and have proved controversial. See Andrea Pin, The Transnational Drivers 
of Populist Backlash in Europe: The Role of Courts, 20 GERMAN L.J. 225 (2019) (arguing that the 
trend toward constitutionalism has produced a populist backlash in Europe).
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“Respondents’ argument [that a nonresident traditionally can sue 
in our courts on foreign injuries] might have force if they sought 
to sue RJR for violations of their own laws and to invoke federal di-
versity jurisdiction as a basis for proceeding in U.S. courts.”92 This 
view, if established, would be a rule that in a transnational case 
brought by a nonresident, the law of the plaintiff’s home country 
applies, But even if the laws of all the member states of the Euro-
pean Union explicitly provided that, in cases of statutory tort there 
could be no recovery for economic harms, that defense could have 
no rational application to an American tobacco company sued 
here. France’s local defenses exist to protect French defendants. 
France has no interest at all in extending its laws to protect all the 
companies in the world in all the courts in the world from the con-
sequences of their statutory torts. We are talking about the rational 
application of law.93 Once again, we can see defensive argument 
making scant sense when proffered in our configuration of cases. 
(6) The “point” of Civil RICO. We have seen that, having acknowl-
edged that RICO was instinct with extraterritorial intent, Justice 
Alito gave little or no value to that insight. Perhaps Chief Justice 
Roberts might have preferred Justice Alito to have pitched his ar-
gument on the “focus” of the law. Consider its anti-terror provi-
sions enacted in the wake of 9/11. The 9/11 attack on the United 
States was a serious foreign attack on our home country. There was 
damage to the Pentagon as well as to New York skyscrapers and 
surrounding structures. There were some 3,000 dead. In effect, this 
was the first aerial bombardment of the United States by a foreign 
force, deploying four planes. Pitilessly, those were four passenger
planes. (What distinguishes terrorism from freedom fighting, revo-
lution, or war is the terrorists’ deliberate and indiscriminate vio-
lence against civilians.) The foreign force that struck us that day 
was not a foreign nation but rather a foreign criminal organization 
of Islamic terrorists. The Patriot Act, and its amendments to RICO, 
were part of Congress’s response to this. 
The “focus” of the Patriot Act might be supposed, by a territori-
alist Court, to be the various places in this country comprising the 
loci delicti on September 11, 2001: The World Trade Center and 
environs in New York, or the Pentagon in Virginia, or a field in 
Pennsylvania where the heroes of flight 93, with their quiet “Let’s 
roll,” went to their deaths bringing down one of the hijacked 
planes. That plane is now widely believed to have been headed to-
ward the Capitol, in contemplation of murder of the Senators and 
                                                   
 92. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct., at 2109. 
 93. On the essentially local quality of legal defenses, see infra Part III-A(3). 
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members of the House, with the Constitution in the rotunda burn-
ing. Or, more comprehensively, the locus delicti might be the Unit-
ed States itself. But the purpose of RICO is not to deal with hi-
jacked planes, murdered thousands, destroyed skyscrapers, a gut-
gutted financial district, or threats to our seat of government and 
its grand traditions, but rather to deal with criminal organizations 
and their crimes—with rackets and racketeering. 
In the context of the Patriot Act, this means, inter alia, a focus on 
organized money-laundering in support of Islamic terrorism. In 
the context of RICO, this means the conduct of organized criminal 
activity—that is, racketeering. As Justice Alito acknowledged at the 
very outset of his opinion in RJR-Nabisco, “RICO is founded on the 
concept of racketeering activity.”94 Obviously a purpose of “Civil” 
RICO is to bring the prohibitions of RICO home to offending 
companies in their bank accounts and stock prices, and in their 
salaries and bonuses for executives. RICO, in sum, is “focused” on 
organized racketeers and their rackets, wherever the injuries con-
sequent on those rackets may occur. And that focus is extended to 
the list of predicate violations that can ground prosecutions—and 
can also ground actions brought under Civil RICO95—in the Patri-
ot Act’s additions of the offenses of money-laundering abroad and 
support of terrorism. 
Civil RICO is regulatory in a manner complementary to RICO—
it is about deterrence of rackets. Again, dollars are different from 
prison terms, but unquestionably dollars add to deterrence in this 
context. Dollar damages, trebled, will affect predator companies 
and their shareholders, and can drive predator companies into 
bankruptcy,96 affecting those who have financed or supplied them 
as well. 
An American defendant company, having committed tortious 
violations of an act of Congress, is well within the regulatory con-
cerns of the United States, wherever it commits those acts.97 Our 
courts have full power to remediate the torts caused by an Ameri-
can company’s violation of an act of Congress. In the configuration 
of cases we are examining, a foreign place of injury has no con-
cerns to the contrary. It is the very lack of foreign interest in de-
feating claims of foreign injury that makes nonsense of defenses in 
cases in our configuration. 
                                                   
 94. RJR Nabisco, 366 S. Ct., at 2096. 
 95. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 
 96. Individuals violating criminal RICO can be imprisoned up to twenty years. Their 
fines are capped at $250,000. Companies violating criminal RICO can be fined twice the 
gross losses attributable to the violation. 28 U.S.C. § 1963. 
 97. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 57, at § xv (correct-
ly explaining that the location of regulated conduct is immaterial). 
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Today’s task in interpretation of law, habitual with lawyers and 
judges, is text-bound. We tend to subordinate purposive reasoning 
to text. Yet it is not possible to determine the scope of any rule 
without knowing the reason for the rule; its telos, its point. If the 
purpose of Congress in RICO is to deter and punish racketeers, 
that legislation applies to racketeers. It applies, at a minimum to all 
racketeers here, and to American racketeers everywhere. Purposive 
reasoning would suggest that if courts must apply any presumption 
in divining the intentions of a legislature, that presumption should 
accommodate the desired functioning of the legislation, not defeat 
it.
It was the great American legal realist, Karl Llewellyn, who 
pointed out that for every beloved old canon of construction one 
could propose an equally convincing but opposite one.98 Unfortu-
nately, Llewellyn’s famous list of twenty-eight examples does not 
include a presumption against extraterritorial application of statu-
tory law. Had it done so, it might then have included an equal and 
opposite presumption, something like this: “In the silence of a 
statute, territorial limits are not to be judicially inferred to block 
the force of the enactment within the rational scope of its purposes 
and the legislative power.” 
I am confident in this suggestion, and also in its superiority to 
the Court’s presumption, because, as we have been reminded, 
Llewellyn also pointed out in the same article that law cannot be 
interpreted rationally without regard to its purposes.99
* * * * *
The Court in RJR-Nabisco fell into unreason when it refused to 
enforce an act of Congress without a convincing reason for such 
disregard. It was irrational to contend that our foreign relations 
with Europe would be negatively affected by allowing Europe to try 
to prove its case. There was no convincing textual reason to disre-
gard the conceded extraterritorial reach of RICO. There was no 
reason to disapprove a civil action provided by Congress on the 
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ground that the Court likes prosecutions better. There was scant 
sense in the Court’s view that foreign plaintiffs must be satisfied 
with their own countries’ laws even when their own countries have 
no objection to ours. It is true that treble damages are heavy, no 
doubt, but that was the balance struck by Congress between low ac-
tual damages and freewheeling punitive damages. The Court took 
it upon itself to upend an act of Congress for no reason. 
In short, there was no justification for the Court’s failure to en-
force the Act. Justice Alito’s unseemly struggle for reason in an at-
tempt to frustrate the intentions of Congress in a matter of vital na-
tional policy is an embarrassment. But such unreason is inevitable 
in the configuration of cases of which RJR-Nabisco is representative. 
It would appear that a court is under obligation, reflected in the 
oath of office, to give access to the claims of non-residents seeking 
to instantiate the actual regulatory policies of the sovereign at the 
place of trial, and, somewhat surprisingly, cannot escape the obli-
gation on any rational basis. That is something that has not been 
suspected, much less understood. 
D. The Regulatory Interests of the United States 
This paper has proceeded from the tacit premise that the degree 
of national commitment to good conduct on the part of our com-
panies and their executives is a potent determinant of the degree 
of the world’s confidence in our trade relations, business dealings, 
and exports. The rule of law—our own law as enacted by Congress, 
our own regulations thereunder, and the federal common law the 
Supreme Court supplies—is part of our national character in oth-
ers’ eyes, a component of our soft power, if you will. Lax, permis-
sive laws, in this view, to the extent they license substandard con-
duct by our companies and their executives, are injurious, and not 
only to our reputation. Because of the harm to our reputation they 
are injurious to our foreign markets, thus to our international 
commerce, and thus to our economy. Strong regulatory law—law 
furthering safety, reliability, and freedom from corrupt or predato-
ry practices—law extending to the whole of the nation’s power 
over international commerce, over our entire sphere of interest 
and desired influence in our globalized, interconnected world—
self-evidently advances our national interests, shared with other na-
tions, in trade, prosperity, and good relations. 
Because the conduct of our national companies and their repre-
sentatives engages these national interests wherever they act with 
consequences abroad, it becomes necessary that American busi-
nesses and their officers and agents act in accordance with Ameri-
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can law wherever they act, wherever their actions have effect. Of 
course, our companies must also comply with the law in force 
wherever they act—but only when compliance would not require 
violation of our own law. If an American company abroad cannot 
act in compliance with local law without violating ours, that com-
pany, in my view, should not be doing business in that country. 
Nothing should diminish an American company’s obligation to 
conform its conduct to the laws of the United States. 
Thus, it becomes important that American law require good 
conduct without territorial or other arbitrary limits. Unwritten lim-
its on written remedies simply invite misconduct, with damage to 
the interests of the United States. As for a court’s solicitude toward 
a struggling local enterprise, there is no virtue in protecting any 
enterprise from responsibility for wrongdoing—no advantage to 
the company or the polity in allowing a statutory tort to go unrem-
edied. If need be, the company can seek the protections of bank-
ruptcy.100 Acts of Congress are law which every court in this country 
is sworn to uphold. 
To be sure, both conservatives and liberals can see a need to re-
lieve enterprise of undue regulatory burdens. Deregulation com-
mends itself when regulation requires massive paperwork, for ex-
ample, without substantial benefit to anyone. But deregulation by 
irrational judicial fiat does not commend itself. Executives—and 
lawyers and politicians as well—those who are ideologically com-
mitted to the goal of deregulation—might consider that sound 
regulation can cartelize an industry, making affordable the cost of 
doing better business by diminishing or eliminating the price 
competition of companies doing shoddy business. It can require 
honest business from all, freeing all from dishonest competition. 
In this way, national reputational interests can be advanced, and 
our well-regulated companies can share in this advantage. 
What has been said here underscores that the significant con-
tacts between a sovereign and its regulated company, when in the 
courts of the regulating sovereign, are contacts between the regu-
lating sovereign itself and the conduct of the regulated company. 
The location of injury resulting from that conduct is, of course, a 
matter of concern to courts at the place of injury. But the place of 
injury is of concern to the courts of the regulatory state only when 
the conduct-regulating state seeks to measure actual economic 
damages for the injuries caused by the prohibited conduct.101
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* * * * *
We can now see how unreason becomes a predictable feature of 
litigation in the configuration of cases seen in RJR-Nabisco. In that 
litigation, the Roberts Court put itself in the position of protecting 
a predatory company from having to defend a lawsuit. It is not 
clear that the Community could have made out its case; the ques-
tion we are considering, rather, is one of access. Here, access was 
denied on the novel thinking that even expressly-authorized law-
suits should be disapproved in favor of prosecutions, at least in 
cases in which the plaintiff is foreign. The Court stepped in, took a 
hand, and embarked on an unconvincing struggle in the service of 
neutering an act of Congress, with the consequence of insulating 
an American criminal enterprise from exposure to liability at the 
suit of foreign friends. 
This was an award of judgment to the home company without 
the support of a convincing reason. With this, the Supreme Court 
gave its decision every appearance of a naked preference for the 
home party. The little difficulty of apparent want of neutrality thus 
reared its head, rendering the decision in RJR-Nabisco arbitrary and 
indeed unconstitutional as a matter of due process102—whether or 
not the Supreme Court will ever see this. 
Today, RJR is once more a stripped-down North Carolina com-
pany, Reynolds America, in its original business of supplying the 
dwindling market for Camel cigarettes. Recently it has formed R. J. 
Reynolds Vapor Company and has put itself in the business of de-
veloping another addictive—and dangerous103—tobacco product.104
It is a subsidiary of a subsidiary that is wholly owned by a British 
holding company, British American Tobacco, P.L.C.105
II. AN INTERSTATE CASE: ROWE V. HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE
Although Rowe v. Hoffmann–La Roche106 is a choice-of-law case, 
and RJR-Nabisco is not, Rowe is analogous to RJR-Nabisco in that, in 
                                                   
 102. See Caperton, 556 U.S., 868 (2009). 
 103. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and state agencies have reported 
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both cases, a nonresident sues a defendant company at the de-
fendant’s home; access to the law at the place of trial is withheld; 
and there is a surprising inadequacy of reason to explain the re-
sult.
A. A Troubled History 
Hoffmann-La Roche, an American subsidiary of a Swiss holding 
company, is a major manufacturer of pharmaceuticals. The com-
pany has borne a substantial burden of litigation over the suffi-
ciency of its warnings of the dangerous side effects of its once-
popular acne medication, Accutane.107
Accutane is not a topical ointment; it is a drug taken internally. 
Its side effects include substantial risks of deep depression, at-
tempted suicide, and suicide. The company’s original warnings 
were compliant with the regulations of the federal Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). But the company appears to have taken a 
deliberate decision not to update its warnings108 as claims of injury 
and death mounted.109
Like RJR-Nabisco, Hoffmann-La Roche sought salvation from its 
litigation troubles and consequent financial difficulties in spin-offs 
and mergers. There was an attempt to fix prices in international 
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markets; the Justice Department fined the company a half billion 
dollars in that scandal.110
In the case that would become Rowe v. Hoffmann-La Roche,111 the 
back-story begins up in Michigan, when Robert Rowe, at the time a 
sixteen-year-old lad with a stubborn case of acne, went to a doctor 
and received a prescription for Accutane. Some three months after 
he stopped taking the medicine a mysterious deep depression fell 
upon the boy,112 and he drove his car into a house in an attempt to 
commit suicide. He sustained serious injuries. (I cannot say that I 
believe this story, but the case arose on review of a successful mo-
tion to dismiss, and we must take the allegations of the plausible 
complaint as true.) 
Several years after these events, Rowe discovered that depression 
and suicide were side effects of Accutane. He sued. The gravamen 
of his products liability suit was the failure of the defendant Hoff-
mann-La Roche to warn of the serious side effects of Accutane, 
specifically the risk of suicidal depression. 
Robert Rowe, being a resident of Michigan, might have sued the 
company there. Personal jurisdiction could be had under Michi-
gan’s long-arm statute.113 But it is hard to say that in suing in New 
Jersey Rowe was forum shopping in some pejorative sense, since 
New Jersey was a principal place of the company’s business in the 
United States. However, Rowe undoubtedly was counting on secur-
ing the benefit of New Jersey law.114 He would certainly lose his case 
if it were tried under the law of his home state, Michigan. 
B. A Problematic Presumption 
Michigan’s warning requirements for dangerous pharmaceuti-
cals could conceivably be read as codifying needed basic regulation 
of the conduct of its own makers of pharmaceuticals, and might 
have been thought to provide law for Robert Rowe’s case. But 
Michigan draws a line that makes the overriding effect of its law 
protective of its resident pharmaceutical companies. When Rowe 
first brought his case, Michigan was also a principal place of busi-
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ness of Pfizer, the giant pharmaceuticals house, and scores of other 
pharmaceutical and medical device companies, clustered particu-
larly around Michigan’s great university at Ann Arbor.115 Michigan 
had every incentive to protect its pharmaceuticals industry from li-
abilities that in its view might be excessive. 
To be sure, Michigan law requires that drug makers in Michigan 
conform to the warning requirements imposed by the federal Food 
and Drug Administration.116 Courts tend to apply a presumption of 
sufficiency to warnings that conform to FDA regulations. Michigan 
achieves its protective but reasonable goal by making this presump-
tion conclusive.117 This Michigan statute would certainly have de-
feated Rowe’s case if he had filed it in Michigan, because Hoff-
mann-LaRoche’s warnings had fully complied with FDA 
regulations at the time Accutane went on the market. 
New Jersey’s regulation of drug warnings, on the other hand, is 
more stringent than the FDA’s. The relevant New Jersey statute al-
so presumes the adequacy of FDA-compliant warnings, but makes 
the presumption rebuttable.118 Under New Jersey case law, the pre-
sumption can be rebutted by a failure to update warnings in light 
of post-approval experience.119 However, mere negligence in failure 
to update warnings is not enough to rebut the presumption. There 
must be a knowing failure to update, if significant unwarned risks 
emerge in medical reports and litigation. If, in the face of mount-
ing evidence of a dangerous side effect, there is reckless disregard 
or deliberate concealment—if, in other words, the case ordinarily 
would warrant punitive damages—the presumption of sufficiency 
of the warnings is rebutted.120 Nevertheless, although New Jersey 
law requires a showing that punitive damages would be appropri-
ate, New Jersey law precludes awards of punitive damages.121
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Robert Rowe was therefore seeking compensatory damages only. 
He argued that, if Hoffmann-La Roche’s warnings had been up-
graded to reveal the more serious risks of Accutane as they became 
apparent, he would not have used Accutane. His injuries, which 
were severe, would have been prevented. One suspects that few 
purchasers do read the long multilingual lists of dire side effects in 
small print on thin paper folded and inserted into a box. But in 
thinking about Rowe’s case we must assume that if warnings accu-
rately disclosing the risks of Accutane had been available, Robert 
Rowe would have read them and would not have used the drug. 
The New Jersey trial court ruled that Michigan law applied and 
granted the manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment. After 
all, Michigan was the place of injury, and, besides, it seemed rea-
sonable to apply Michigan law to a resident of Michigan, who pur-
chased a drug in Michigan with a prescription furnished by a Mich-
igan doctor. However, on the facts of Rowe, the apparently “reason-
“reasonable” choice of Michigan law would have been irrational. 
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed on 
this ground.122
Using a basic interest analysis, the Appellate Division, by Judge 
Wecker, held, correctly, that Michigan’s defendant-protecting 
standard had no rational application in Rowe’s case, since there 
was no Michigan defendant in the case to protect. Judge Wecker 
then correctly identified New Jersey’s interest as regulatory.123 He 
saw that New Jersey had an interest in providing a more patient-
protective standard to govern cases of a defendant drug company’s 
knowing or reckless failure to update its warnings as evidence of 
danger emerged. Judge Wecker could rely, in support of this think-
ing, on an earlier case in New Jersey’s Supreme Court.124 Thus, New 
Jersey law applied. 
There was a dissent in the Appellate Division. Among other 
things, the dissent identified an interest in New Jersey’s not becom-
ing a magnet forum.125 This concern, although speculative and dis-
connected from the pleadings, was to surface again in the state’s 
Supreme Court. Given the rather nice work in the Appellate Divi-
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sion, it was something of a shock when the state’s Supreme Court 
reversed,126 holding that Robert Rowe’s case must be dismissed. 
C. The Struggle for Reason 
(1) An unconvincing construction. The New Jersey high court’s 
opinion in Rowe,127 by Judge LeFelt, opened by re-classifying Rowe,
not implausibly, as a no-conflict case. Judge LeFelt reasoned that 
both New Jersey and Michigan require warnings of dangerous side 
effects in the labeling of pharmaceuticals. Both states seek to pro-
tect their residents. The difference, then, was one of degree only. 
It was a minor difference in the strength of the presumption of suf-
ficiency of the FDA requirements; the two statutes were “substan-
tially congruent.”128
This seemingly plausible argument loses force when we recall 
the actual workings of the Michigan statute. As we have seen, there 
was no way to construe Michigan law as simply protective of Michi-
gan patients who might purchase pharmaceutical products manu-
factured out of state. That vague speculation should have been 
forestalled by the fact that Michigan’s conclusive presumption 
clearly insulated FDA-compliant drug companies from liability.129
Michigan’s immunity rule could rationally comprise only a de-
fense, and a defense only for Michigan drug companies; Michigan 
had no interest in protecting every other state’s drug companies—
as the Appellate Division had perceived.  
Judge LeFelt properly abandoned this line of reasoning but, 
strangely, did not delete it. He seems to have concluded, after a re-
view of earlier cases, that his “no-conflict” classification could be 
made to square with New Jersey precedent only if he were pre-
pared to apply New Jersey law and to let Rowe’s case go forward. 
Instead, he wound up ruling that Rowe was a “true conflict” after 
all, since the laws differed and the difference would affect the out-
come.130 This definition of a “true conflict” was unhelpful. It would 
also describe a “false conflict” (a case in which only one state has a 
governmental interest, but the laws differ and the outcome would 
differ depending on which state’s law applied). It would also de-
scribe an unprovided case (a case in which neither state has a gov-
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ernmental interest, but the laws differ and the outcome would de-
pend on which was applied).131
Judge LeFelt proceeded to identify what he thought to be the 
respective states’ interests. He was correct that New Jersey’s gov-
ernmental interest in the case was regulatory (this had been held 
in the same earlier New Jersey case on which the court below had 
relied).132 But he fell again into unreason when he tried to identify 
Michigan’s interest in its conclusive presumption of adequacy as an 
interest in making prescription drugs more affordable to Michigan’s 
citizens.133
This is a poignant example of the souring of defensive argument 
in cases configured as Rowe was. Carried to the extreme, Judge 
LeFelt’s affordability argument would lead to the conclusion that 
there is a legitimate governmental interest in deleting the law of 
products liability altogether, on the theory that eliminating the ex-
pense of defending the lawsuits would make products more afford-
able. The reality is that nobody wants to make dangerous products 
more affordable. Why would Michigan want to make more availa-
ble to its residents a life-threatening drug of last resort like Accu-
tane, particularly when the manufacturer has knowingly obscured 
the news that the drug could kill them? 
Then, too, it is hardly obvious that adding a line to the existing 
warnings would make a drug more expensive. On the contrary, 
drugs are less expensive the fewer wrongful death lawsuits are 
brought, extracting dollars from the maker. 
(2) The scales of injustice. Judge LeFelt went on to weigh this non-
existent Michigan interest in the affordability of killer drugs 
against New Jersey’s regulatory interest. The weighing of govern-
mental interests is a process—however popular—that the Supreme 
Court of the United States has wisely disapproved in its own inter-
state conflicts cases,134 and one in which analysts of my stripe would 
also prefer not to indulge. The United States Supreme Court has 
been quite correct in its perception that a court must remain free 
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to apply its own law and policies, however weighty some other poli-
ty’s interests might be in the matter. But with this dubious “weigh-
ing,” Judge LeFelt was able to conclude that Michigan law—which 
we have seen to be without rational application in Rowe’s case—
was the only appropriate law for it.135
(3) On forum shopping. We have seen that a significant feature of 
Judge LeFelt’s opinion was his well-expressed feeling that there was 
something abusive about a nonresident’s using New Jersey courts. 
Judges tend to see actions by nonresidents as forum shopping and 
tend to see forum shopping as an evil. But this reaction seems odd 
in a case like Rowe, in which the plaintiff has come to the very place 
where the defendant company has its principal place of business, 
arguably the most convenient and appropriate place of trial against 
any company, from the company’s own perspective. 
In Rowe, one might conclude that, in dismissing the case of a fo-
rum-shopping plaintiff, Rowe was a clear case of discrimination 
against the nonresident. But in Judge LeFelt’s view, a Michigan in-
dividual had come to New Jersey with his late-blooming Michigan 
miseries to sue a valued local enterprise. Judge LeFelt candidly 
wrote,
To allow a life-long Michigan resident who received an 
FDA-approved drug in Michigan and alleges injuries sus-
tained in Michigan to by-pass his own state’s law and obtain 
compensation for his injuries in this State’s courts com-
pletely undercuts Michigan’s interests, while overvaluing 
our true interest in this litigation. In this instance, where 
the challenged drug was approved by the FDA and suit was 
brought by an out-of-state plaintiff who has no cause of ac-
tion in his home state, this State’s interest in ensuring that 
our corporations are deterred from producing unsafe 
products . . . must yield. . . .136
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adopted, would repeal Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2946(5), and enact a rebuttable presump-
tion that products are safe if they are subject to, and comply with, pertinent government 
safety standards. But the Court thought it imprudent to delay, given the vagaries of legisla-
tive action. 
 136. Rowe, 917 A.2d at 778. For an amusing view of the Michigan “diaspora” of plaintiffs 
seeking to avoid Michigan’s conclusive presumption of adequacy, see Eric Alexander, Michi-
gan Strikes Back in Pennsylvania, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2017/12/michigan-strikes-back-in-
pennsylvania.html (discussing the phenomenon of the “tourism” of the “Michigan Diaspo-
ra”); see also Eric Alexander, Direct-Filed MDL Case on Thin Ice for Personal Jurisdiction, DRUG &
DEVICE L., https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/author/ealexander (last visited Oct. 29, 
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Note here the inadvertently revelatory self-contradicting admis-
sion that Michigan’s interest was defendant-protecting, after all. 
Apparently, the holding in Rowe was less an application of Michi-
gan law than an expression of the New Jersey judges’ objections to 
being made use of.137 In 2018 the New Jersey high court clearly re-
pudiated Rowe on this point, ruling that choices of law must not be 
based on animus to nonresidents.138
Judicial distaste for forum shopping, endemic as it is, is forgetful 
of the fact that the plaintiff’s choice of forum is not only in the 
long tradition of the common law in this country,139 but also is re-
flected in the traditional understandings of freedom and federal-
ism that underlie the promise of interstate Privileges and Immuni-
ties guaranteed by Article IV, and in particular, traditional 
understandings of interstate access to courts, a vital part of that 
promise.140 Moreover, notwithstanding that the forum shopping 
plaintiff gains the advantage of favorable forum law, all that that 
plaintiff actually gets, in most instances, is a chance to prove its 
case.
I will return to this forum shopping issue shortly.141
(4) By what authority? We have seen that the New Jersey high 
court was unable to find a convincing reason for departing from 
New Jersey’s own law. Yet it nevertheless applied Michigan law and 
threw the case out. Even if Michigan’s statutory defense could have 
been applied rationally in Rowe, a question would still be raised, 
here as in RJR-Nabisco: By what authority does a court disregard its 
own sovereign’s applicable and constitutional law? 
                                                   
2019). The author praises Pennsylvania for a recent change. Pennsylvania now will irration-
ally apply the law of an uninterested state, Michigan, to defeat the cases of Michigan “tour-
ists” seeking better law than they can get at home. The author praises those federal courts 
which have done the same. I note that federal courts are required to apply the law that the 
plaintiff’s chosen forum state “would” apply. Cf. Klaxon v. Stentor, 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Van 
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). 
 137. For the realist argument that choices of foreign (non-forum) law should be under-
stood as forum law, since they reflect the forum judiciary’s actual preferences, see infra Part 
III-A.
 138. See In re Accutane Litigation, 194 A.3d 503, 522 (N.J 2018) (on certified questions, 
ruling that a court should not apply its choice-of-law principles in a way that discriminates 
against nonresidents). 
 139. On the deference due a plaintiff’s choice of forum, see Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 
U.S. 612 (1964) (holding in a transferred case that the law of the transferor court governs at 
the transferee court, including the transferor court’s choice-of-law rules). For current dis-
cussion of the deference due the plaintiff’s choice of forum in a state’s written and common 
law, see Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp. v. Kerrigan, 174 A.3d 351 (Md. 2017). 
 140. On the right of access to courts as emanating from the Article IV Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, see Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); 
Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 249 (1898). 
 141. On the problem of “the magnet forum,” see infra Part III-A, III-C(2).
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In failing to enforce its own statute, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in Rowe defeated the modest regulatory intentions of New 
Jersey’s own legislature while advancing no interest of its sister 
state. Indeed, if Rowe’s home state of Michigan can be said to have 
had any interest at all in Rowe’s case, it might have been a certain 
warm glow of expectation that its resident would bring home a lit-
tle money.142
Even if Rowe had been a true conflict—even if Michigan could 
have had any legitimate governmental interest in preventing its res-
ident, Robert Rowe, from recovering for his injuries in a state that 
would allow recovery143—that would not have been reason enough 
for the New Jersey high court to avoid the obligation of applying its 
own regulatory law against its own company within the scope of the 
regulation, as the Appellate Division saw. The presumption of suf-
ficiency of FDA-compliant warnings having been rebutted in 
Rowe’s case, Rowe was entitled to have his case heard. There was 
no need to look to Michigan law. 
One often hears of “comity” in a two-sovereign litigation. But 
comity certainly ought not to be extended to the uninterested state 
in a false conflict case.144 Indeed, I would argue that comity need 
not (and, I would argue, ought not) extend even to an interested 
                                                   
 142. On recoveries as sparing innocent dependents and heirs, taxpayers, medical ser-
vices, and charitable resources, see infra note 208. 
 143. For a startling example of this sort of unreason, see, e.g., Laugelle v. Bell Helicopter 
Textron, Inc., No. 10C–12–054, 2013 WL 5460164 (Del. Super. 2013) (in a wrongful death 
suit, the defendant’s corporate home state applying the law of the plaintiffs’ home state, 
Massachusetts, as place of the grieving family’s mental anguish, to deny recovery for mental 
anguish). The Delaware Court took the position that Massachusetts, the widow’s home state, 
was the place of most significant contact with the widow’s grief, and therefore Massachusetts 
law applied. But Massachusetts had no interest in protecting Delaware corporations or Texas 
manufacturers from damages for grief, and Delaware had a regulatory interest in allowing 
damages for grief as against a Delaware corporation found to be at fault in the death of a 
helicopter pilot. A counterargument was available, that, as place of incorporation only, Del-
aware’s only governmental interest in Bell Helicopter was in its corporate governance. 
Laugelle probably should have been resolved by Delaware law, in the bare justice-furnishing 
interest of the forum. See infra Part III-D(3). Another solution would have been a decision 
henceforth to apply Delaware’s substantive rules of decision when a Delaware corporation 
with no other contact with Delaware than as place of incorporation is sued in Delaware for a 
tort. In its footnote 19, the Laugelle court explains that the plaintiffs declined to rely on Tex-
as law. It appears that economic loss was a significant part of the damages claimed, and un-
der Texas law, when so claimed, economic damages are held to be exclusive. 
 144. In the language of governmental interest analysis in choice-of-law theory, a false 
conflict is a case in which there is only one interested state—that is, only one state with an 
interest in having its law applied to a particular issue. In such cases a court obviously should 
apply the law of the only interested state to that issue. These sorts of analyses were the con-
tribution of Brainerd Currie. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS,
supra note 131, including, on page 77, one of the most influential law-review articles in 
American legal history, his Married Women’s Contracts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958). For a 
general exegesis see Louise Weinberg, A Radically Transformed Restatement for Conflicts, supra 
note 106. 
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non-forum state in a true conflict case.145 What matters is the fo-
rum’s own law and policy. 
It is true that New Jersey’s regulatory law would benefit not only 
New Jersey residents, but all users of New Jersey pharmaceuticals, 
wherever their injuries were suffered. It is a characteristic of regu-
latory law—conduct-regulating law—that it necessarily applies to 
the regulated conduct wherever it is engaged in, wherever and to 
whomever any injuries consequent on a violation occur.146 New Jer-
sey’s statute, to the extent it is enforced, helps to assure national 
and world markets of the safety of New Jersey pharmaceuticals, and 
underscores the reliability of warnings accompanying them. The 
company shares this interest with the state. 
D. The Regulatory Interests of a State 
Our reading of Rowe v. Hoffmann-La Roche underscores the im-
portance of regulatory interests at the place of trial and reveals the 
want of reason that seems to accompany failure to give effect to 
them.
It is common wisdom that, over the long haul, companies con-
cerned about vulnerability to suit, as, for example, a corporation 
owning a highly polluting paper mill, will tend to produce its risky 
or polluting products in a state the laws of which are, on the whole, 
favorable to its activities. In addition, the presence of a valuable en-
terprise in a state, depending upon the means and political sophis-
tication of that enterprise, will itself tend, over time, to produce 
law protective of that enterprise. When, however, the influence 
even of a valuable and politically powerful industry147 is not entirely 
successful, and law is enacted reining in perceived excesses in that 
industry, we may conclude that the regulatory interests of the state 
are considerable, however modest the regulation. 
                                                   
 145. Cf. Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Acc. Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935); Pac. Em-
ployers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Acc. Comm’n, 306 U.S. 393, 404–05 (1939) (both cases holding 
that the interested forum need not apply the law of another interested state). I would go 
beyond this. In my view, the interested forum should not apply another state’s law, even if the 
other state also has a legitimate governmental interest in applying its law. 
 146. Accord, DRAFT RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 57. 
 147. For a possible example of the political power of the national pharmaceutical indus-
try, apparently extending to power over the Food and Drug Administration—the agency 
that is supposed to be its watchdog—see the puzzling if not distressing failure-to-warn case 
of Merck, Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct 1668 (2019). This case raises the 
question whether a state-law failure-to-warn claim is preempted, in a case in which the FDA 
rejected the drug manufacturer’s proposal to warn about a risk, although the FDA was provid-
ed with the relevant scientific data. The court remanded for discreet bench trial to assess the 
FDA’s reasons for rejecting the proposed additional warning. 
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Even so, in some instances a company in that industry may well 
see the point of a given regulation and approve of it.148 As we have 
seen, regulatory law offers benefits. Competitors in the state might 
welcome a level playing field, and, after all, the state’s reputational 
interests are also the industry’s. 
The New Jersey high court fell down the rabbit hole of unreason 
when it began rooting around for arguments that might justify its 
failure to vindicate New Jersey’s regulatory interests. Rowe, like RJR-
Nabisco, demonstrates the irrationality of defense arguments in cas-
es in which the court refuses to allow a nonresident to try to recov-
er under forum law at the defendant’s home.149 One sees in these 
examples the difficulty of finding rational bases for departures 
from plaintiff-favoring forum law when the plaintiff, a nonresident, 
leaves her home to sue the defendant at his.150 And each of our two 
cases illustrates how the analyst’s familiar descriptor, “plaintiff-
favoring,” can fail to capture the regulatory interests of the forum, 
which may be more aptly described as “defendant-regulating.” 
                                                   
 148. For one industry’s interest in uniform governance, see, e.g., Tim Worstall, Why 
Google, Facebook, the Internet Giants, Are Arguing for Net Neutrality, FORBES (July 15, 2014, 4:08 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2014/07/15/why-google-facebook-the-
internet-giants-are-arguing-for-net-neutrality/#771233d048a0. 
 149. For the views of the chief proponent of codified rules, now more sophisticated than 
past rules because distilled from insights gleaned from interest analysis and empirical study, 
see, among his many fine writings, Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice-of-Law Methodology: Fifty 
Years After Brainerd Currie, 2015 ILL. L. REV. 197 (2015). For an equally optimistic argument 
that departures from forum law in the interests of comity and interstate harmony, fairness as 
well as justice, are an important benefit of the law of conflict of laws, and that the occasion 
for such departures can be reduced to a few simple rules, incorporating the insights of the 
interest analysts, see Joseph William Singer, Multistate Justice: Better Law, Comity, and Fairness 
in the Conflict of Laws, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1923 (2015). For similar views brought to bear 
more specifically upon transnational litigation, see the learned and interesting Donald Earl 
Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 11 (2010). For influential earlier challenges to interest analysis, see Douglas 
Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of 
Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992); Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House 
Without Foundations, 46 OH. ST. L. J. 459 (1985). But see Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 
GEORGETOWN L. J. 53 (1991); Louise Weinberg, On Departing from Forum Law, 35 MERCER L.
REV. 595 (1984) (arguing that departures from forum law are irrational, discriminatory, un-
just, and unconstitutional). I have proposed that the whole field be reorganized by kinds of 
conflict, as identified by interest analysis, rather than kinds of claims. See Weinberg, A Radi-
cally Transformed Restatement for Conflicts, supra note 106. But, in the realist tradition, I have 
had to come to a simpler conclusion. The only rule I rely on here is the rule of lex fori.
 150. Of course, cases will arise in which a faraway state boasts law that is “better,” law that 
is remedial, as opposed to the defendant-protecting law of the forum. (The plaintiff will 
have been forced to the defendant-protecting forum by jurisdictional rules, or by the univer-
sality of a particular defendant-protecting rule.) In such cases, the forum tempted to “apply” 
better law should instead “adopt” it as its own. According to local-law theory, as developed by 
American legal realists, the law applied by the forum, whatever its source, is always the fo-
rum’s own law, as a practical matter, because it reflects the forum’s own policy choices. 
Moreover, honest adoption of the chosen rule, when possible, will help to minimize the dis-
crimination and dysfunction that accompany a departure from pre-existing forum law. 
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The good news from New Jersey is that, in 2017, in the case of 
McCarrell v. Hoffmann-La Roche, New Jersey’s Supreme Court, in ef-
fect, repudiated Rowe.151 On the certified question whether New 
Jersey’s equitable tolling provision could be applied to keep alive a 
nonresident’s case against Hoffmann-La Roche (a case also involv-
ing Accutane and the inadequacy of its warnings), the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that New Jersey’s equitable tolling law was in-
deed applicable, and the plaintiff would have a chance to prove 
her case.152 The court relied on New Jersey’s strong regulatory in-
terests in the safety of New Jersey pharmaceuticals.153 Although the 
court avoided dealing with Rowe beyond a bare irrelevant citation 
to it, McCarrell was an obvious repudiation of the reasoning in 
Rowe. The New Jersey court reached this result under Restatement 
(Second), but it acknowledged that it would have reached the same 
result under its former method, governmental interest analysis.154
III. SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Democratic Theory and Local Law Theory 
(1) On departing from forum law. Perhaps it is time to 
acknowledge that departures from the law of the forum are prob-
lematic. It is understood that such departures from the law of the 
forum are discriminatory.155 But commentators (myself included) 
have not sufficiently taken into account that departures from the 
law of the forum will also undermine the regulatory concerns of 
the forum when the forum is the defendant’s home state. Those 
are cases in which, as I have been arguing, regulatory interests 
need to be recognized and accorded full value, mindful of the fact 
                                                   
 151. McCarrell v. Hoffmannn-La Roche, Inc., 153 A.3d 207 (N.J. 2017); see also In re Ac-
cutane Litigation, 194 A.3d 503 (N.J. 2018). In this latter case, a class action, the New Jersey 
court held the presumption of adequacy of warnings to have been rebutted, where Hoff-
mann-La Roche could not have known of the particular risk, a risk of inflammatory bowel 
disease. Of course, Hoffmann knows now. 
 152. McCarrell, 153 A.3d  at 225. 
 153. Id. at 211 (stating that “Our jurisprudence has long recognized that this State has a 
substantial interest in deterring its manufacturers from placing dangerous products in the 
stream of commerce. Inadequate warning labels can render prescription medications dan-
gerous.”). 
 154. Id.
 155. For the leading early work on discrimination in the conflict of laws, see Brainerd 
Currie & Herma Hill Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Equal 
Protection, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1960); Brainerd Currie & Herma Hill Schreter, Unconstitu-
tional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323 (1960). 
For the “comfort” of the American Law Institute (ALI) reporters with this stubborn fact, see 
infra Part III-C.
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that regulatory law is likely to be law that has overcome powerful 
political opposition for critical reasons of public safety or order. 
The forum with regulatory interests raises most acutely the gen-
eral question whether it is ever appropriate for a court to disregard 
its own laws and policies. If the honest answer seems to be “No,” 
the logical conclusion is that abstract choice-of-law “rules” are fun-
damentally unsound. It is the whole point of choice-of-law rules to 
decide, in an abstract, neutral way, whether or not to give access to 
the forum’s own law. The first questions that come to mind are 
whether, and how, a court can disregard the commands of its own 
legislature—a legislature voted into office by its own citizenry? How 
can it do this when under the oath of office? What theory of de-
mocracy could support judicial disregard of an American state’s 
own legislation, if it is constitutional and there is no supreme fed-
eral law to the contrary? For that matter, how can any state su-
preme court disregard its own cases, without candidly overruling 
them? The more urgent questions are whether local law obtained 
in the public interest and for the general welfare, notwithstanding 
great political pressure, might even be the more precious when 
within the special keeping of local courts. 
These questions are complicated by an old observation. All law 
applied in courts can be seen as local law.156 When a court chooses 
some other state’s law, it is, after all, making its own policy choice. 
These questions are further complicated by the fact that a state leg-
islature can certainly empower its courts to apply the laws of other 
sovereigns. The legislature can enact a code of choice-of-law rules. 
Or it can authorize courts to develop choice-of-law rules. 
We can acknowledge these complicaations and nevertheless see 
that political theory, democratic values, and the oath of office all 
suggest that a court’s duty is to its own statutes and cases. In this 
country, of course, state law must give way to supreme federal law, 
but that imperative aside, it appears that the interested forum can-
not depart from its own law without discrimination and other un-
fairness.157
                                                   
 156. For early realist perceptions that the forum always applies its own law whatever it 
says it is doing, see, e.g., Guinness v. Miller, 291 F. 769, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (Hand, L., stating 
that “no court can enforce any law but that of its own sovereign, and, when a suitor comes to 
a jurisdiction foreign to the place of the tort, he can only invoke an obligation recognized by 
that [the forum] sovereign”); Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict 
of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457, 469 (1924). See also Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy 
and the Conflict of Laws, 33 Yale L.J. 736, 748 (1924) (regarding local policy); see also David 
Cavers, The Two “Local Law” Theories, 63 HARV. L. REV. 822 (1950); Frederick J. de Sloovère, 
The Local Law Theory and Its Implications in the Conflict of Laws, 41 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1928). 
 157. For my long-discomfort with departures from forum law, see supra note 149. 
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Prudential considerations alone should counsel greater respect 
for the law of the forum. Since plaintiffs tend to sue where they 
can win, the plaintiff enters the forum as an agent of enforcement 
of law and local policy. When such private attorneys general are 
denied access to local law, the chance of enforcement is lost, and 
the forum relinquishes its own justice. 
(2) The non-neutrality of “neutral” systems. “Neutral” systems of ab-
stract rules purporting to require disinterested, fair “choices” of 
other states’ laws can produce departures from the law of the court 
chosen by plaintiffs, and thus inevitably must often yield defend-
ant-favoring results. In other words, choice-of-law rules are likely to 
be defendant-biased, since they exist to legitimize departures from 
the law of the forum. 
Consistent forum bias is plaintiff-biased, no doubt. But it has this 
merit, that the plaintiff seeks enforcement of law. And it has this 
limit, that the plaintiff does not necessarily “win,” but gains only a 
chance to prove its case, or has restored to it the verdict of a jury. 
On the other hand, consistent defendant bias has this demerit, 
that the law under which an action was brought will not be en-
forced. And defendant-bias suffers from an immoderate and unjust 
consequence, that the defendant, an alleged wrongdoer, typically 
“wins,” and does so without trial of the merits. One sees this with 
disturbing clarity in cases against known predators such as RJR-
Nabisco. 
That courts are free to “choose” the law that governs them is a 
long-hallowed and unshakable tradition, but it is troubling. It is es-
pecially troubling when choices of law are effected through appli-
cation of a set of “rules.” Rules, gratifyingly neutral because of their 
very abstraction, even if codified and enacted, are only unrealities 
superimposed upon reality. By design, they are mechanisms de-
tached from the human crises to which they are addressed. In the 
two examples this Article offers, I think the reader will feel not on-
ly the offense to democracy when the forum denies its own law, but 
also, in the very arbitrariness of such denials, an offense to due 
process, a risk of pointless injustice when a departure from forum 
law will favor a tortfeasor for no reason, and an appearance of bias 
when, as is likely, that tortfeasor is a resident of the forum. 
In a wholly domestic version of Rowe, what would authorize New 
Jersey to deprive Rowe of his day in court? What purpose would be 
served by not putting him to his proof? What purpose would be 
served by shielding Hoffmann-La Roche from having to defend 
against accusations of reckless indifference which we know to be 
accurate? Why, then, should it make a difference that the plaintiff, 
Robert Rowe, is a nonresident? Does not a discrimination between 
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residents and nonresidents need justification? Must not a discrimi-
nation have at least some rational basis? Under Article IV’s Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause, can residence in another state of this 
Union, without more, justify denying access to the law of the fo-
rum? 
The starry-eyed search for better choice-of-law systems, it would 
appear, has been naïve, mistaken, and indeed, seriously subversive 
of the rule of law. 
(3) The “better law” problem. Not all departures from forum law 
are defendant-favoring. Consider a case in which law is chosen 
through the blind application of some naïve “jurisdiction-
selecting” choice rule (such as “the law of the place of injury gov-
erns if it is also the place of conduct”158), and by some stroke of 
luck the plaintiff is thereby afforded a chance to prove her case—a 
chance which forum law would have denied her.159 While the de-
fendant-oriented observer may feel some annoyance, the plaintiff-
favoring observer may feel a twinge of gladness for the fortunate 
plaintiff. It is part of her good fortune that, as it happens, the cho-
sen state does have constitutional power, since, as place of injury 
and conduct, it has strong deterrent and remedial interests in hav-
ing its deterrent and remedial law applied. But we may feel some 
unease. We know that the forum is the place where the defend-
ant’s insurer has a principal place of business and where both par-
ties reside, and we know that as joint domicile of the parties, the 
forum picks up some power to settle their dispute. Let us suppose 
that the law of the forum favors the defendant. The parties, let us 
suppose, are related—husband and wife. Let us suppose that the 
forum protects its insurance companies from suits that might be 
collusive. In a case such as this, the departure from forum law may 
not seem quite right. The forum here has a legitimate interest in 
applying its law, and thus constitutional power to do so. Although 
the law at the place of injury and conduct is more remedial, and, in 
my view, “better,” I have been arguing that the interested forum 
cannot depart from its own law.160
                                                   
 158. This is the position of the ALI in the forthcoming RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 6.04. 
 159. This anomalous situation might arise for any reason, including careless legal repre-
sentation. It might arise, for example, in a case dismissed for forum non conveniens, on the 
theory that the plaintiff should sue in the country in which she was injured. Once at that 
foreign locale she finds, to her relief, that that place chooses to apply the law of the place of 
conduct, which turns out to be favorable to her, although the law of the place of injury itself 
would not have been favorable to her. 
160. See Weinberg, A Radically Transformed Restatement for Conflicts, supra note 106, at 
2017.
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With this “better law” problem, I am invoking the early work of 
Professor Robert Leflar, the legal theorist who advocated that the 
forum choose “better law.”161 Better law was one of Leflar’s influen-
tial “choice-influencing considerations,”162 to be used in deciding 
cases of true conflict. “Better” law, to Leflar, I would venture to say, 
was remedial law. It is true that, in the run of tort cases, plaintiff-
favoring law is, in fact, “better,” in the sense that the typical plain-
tiff seeks enforcement of law. The plaintiff in a case of tort vindi-
cates the basic compensatory and deterrent policies underlying the 
law of torts. These are policies that are widely shared.163 The poli-
cies underlying tort defenses, on the other hand, are generally quite 
local. They are exceptions to more widely-shared tort policies, and 
are deployed to ensure the well-being of some valued local enter-
prise or industry. 
The home of a great manufacturer of washing machines might 
provide a defense or two for cases of washing-machine floods—
perhaps a short statute of limitations, or a cap on damages. But de-
fenses reflect an essentially parochial state interest. Other states 
may or may not share interests in sparing the makers of washing 
machines from oppressive liabilities. But all states share an interest 
in remedying the harms caused to their residents by badly de-
signed products, and in deterring bad design in products sold on 
their markets or sold to their residents. 
Lawyers and judges are rarely explicit about remedial law as 
“better law,” not liking to seem to be favoring a party. But the re-
                                                   
 161. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV.
267, 275 passim (1966). 
 162. Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law, More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 1584, 1586–88 (1966). The five considerations were: (1) predictability of result, (2) 
preservation of interstate or international order, (3) simplicity in application for the judici-
ary, (4) the forum’s governmental interests, and (5) application of the better law. See also
Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 377, 377 (1966) (proposing “principles of preference”). See also the famed and widely 
disregarded “Section 6” of RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW INST. 1967), with 
its list of factors to be taken into account in determining the state of most significant contact 
with a case. Good writers and fine judges from their day to this have not grasped that true 
conflicts do not need solving—that the interested forum must apply its own law. Weinberg, 
A Radically Transformed Restatement for Conflicts, supra note 106. I would go further today, and 
say that even the uninterested forum in a false conflict case (i.e., the other state is an inter-
ested state) must apply its own law. That is because I am identifying adjudicatory interests. 
See infra Part III-D. If more remedial law (i.e., “better” law) exists within the rationally-
assessed power of another state, the forum tempted to “apply” it should, instead, adopt the 
remedial position as its own. 
 163. But see Larry Kramer, The Myth of the “Unprovided-For” Case, 75 VA. L. REV. 1045 
(1989). Dean Kramer does not want to take into account this feature of tort policy (that it is 
widely shared) and the essential local-ness of defendant-protecting policy. Id. at 1056. Thus, 
he rejects the proposition advanced, for example, by the late Robert Sedler, that the forum 
apply the law reflecting the shared policies of all states. Robert Sedler, The Governmental In-
terest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 181, 190 
(1977).
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medial vector of law is basic, and there are important recognitions 
of this truth. We find it in the familiar maxim of ancient Roman 
law, “Ubi jus, ibi remedium;” and in Blackstone’s Commentaries;164 ech-
oed in our greatest case, Marbury v. Madison: 
[I]t is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of Eng-
land, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, 
and every injury its proper redress [quoting Blackstone]. 
The government of the United States has been emphatical-
ly termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will cer-
tainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws fur-
nish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.165
This essential justice-seeking vector of law in courts is also found in 
such famous American opinions at federal common law as Chief 
Justice Chase’s, while sitting on Circuit in admiralty way back in 
1873 in the case of The Sea Gull, Chase wrote, “[C]ertainly it better 
becomes the humane and liberal character of proceedings in ad-
miralty to give than to withhold the remedy, when not required to 
withhold it by established and inflexible rules.”166
All this said, there remains something jarring about the com-
mentators’ enthusiasm for better law. It is not obvious, as we have 
seen, that a court should be free to depart from the commands of 
its own legislature in order to apply perceived “better” law else-
where. Fortunately it is somewhat unlikely that there will be bet-
ter—more remedial—law elsewhere, since the plaintiff has had the 
choice of forum. But my point here is that departures from an in-
terested forum’s law, for better or worse, are not, at root, con-
sistent with democratic theory, and, when effected without suffi-
cient rational basis, will turn out to be unconstitutional. 
It might be argued that, in our New Jersey pharmaceuticals case, 
Michigan’s law was not only constitutional but even the better law 
for the case, based as it was on the FDA’s approval. True, Hoff-
mann-La Roche’s warnings had become inadequate, and the FDA 
had taken no further action. However, the FDA has the institutional 
competence to weigh the costs and benefits of a rule as time passes, 
and to strike the right balance.167 Thus, it might be supposed that 
the state should defer to the federal agency. 
This argument fails for three reasons. First, it has never been 
supposed that FDA standards create a ceiling, rather than a floor, 
                                                   
 164. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23 (1768). 
 165. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
 166. The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (C.C. Md. 1865) (Chase C.J., sitting on Circuit). 
 167. I am indebted to Melissa Wasserman and Tom McGarity for this hypothesis. 
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on the states’ powers over the health of their citizens and the du-
ties of their companies. Second, New Jersey’s legislature had al-
ready determined the degree of deference its courts owed to the 
agency determination, and had created a slightly higher and there-
fore “better” level of protection for consumers of New Jersey 
pharmaceuticals. And third, the balance struck here was not be-
tween the FDA and New Jersey, but rather between New Jersey and 
Michigan. But no rational application of Michigan’s conclusive 
presumption was available for balancing against New Jersey’s regu-
latory interest—as we have seen. 
“Better law” is, perhaps, the best rationale for departures from 
forum law. The law of conflict of laws itself might well have its 
origin as an escape device—as an effort by judges to escape unjust 
but applicable home law, and to find better law elsewhere. Choice 
rules become more intelligible if the effort is to find better law 
than the forum can supply—a way to give a tort plaintiff a chance 
to prove her case. 
I have suggested in earlier work that the forum adopt rather than 
“apply” identified “better” law.168 Earlier American legal realists 
made similar suggestions.169 Once a law is seen as “better,” the prac-
tical effect of choosing it will be to undermine the previous posi-
tion. Counsel will point out that home law was departed from, and 
argue for the better position. The sensible thing for courts to do 
with perceived “better” law is to adopt a new rule, rather than pur-
port to continue to honor the old, while “choosing” better law 
elsewhere. 
B. The Constitution and Choices of Law 
(1) Arbitrary choices and due process. When the constitutional pow-
ers of, and constraints upon, courts choosing law are better under-
stood, it will be better remembered that application of an uninter-
ested state’s law is unconstitutional not only because it is 
discriminatory but also, and especially, because it is not due pro-
cess.170 The choice of Michigan law in Rowe’s case was clearly un-
constitutional on both grounds. 
                                                   
 168. Weinberg, A Radically Transformed Restatement for Conflicts, supra note 106, at 2001, 
2021; Louise Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1631, 1632 
(2005); see also Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 1237 (2011). For earlier “local law theory,” see supra note 156. 
  169. In the view of the American legal realists, the forum always applies its own law, 
whatever it says it is doing. Op. cit. supra note 156. 
 170. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818–19 (1985) (holding that applica-
tion of the law of a state with insignificant contacts with a case violates the Due Process 
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Choices of law are subject to constitutional control under the 
Due Process Clause because due process requires some rational basis
for every rule applied in courts. The requirement of some rational 
basis is a requirement of a legitimate governmental interest. Courts 
are not free to apply the law of a state without a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest in the application. 
In 1930, in Home Insurance Company v. Dick,171 the Supreme Court 
laid the basis for this clarified modern understanding. The Court 
held, by Justice Brandeis, that the uninterested Texas forum in that 
case did not have power to apply its own law to a contingent hypo-
thetical obligation of New York re-insurers in connection with a 
boat fire in Mexico. Texas had no legitimate interest in governing 
the case by its own law and could not do so without violating the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.172
Note the interesting parallel between Brandeis’s thinking in Dick
and his thinking in Erie.173 In both cases the Court held that the un-
interested forum—the courts of a sovereign without a legitimate 
governmental interest in the issue before it—could not constitu-
tionally apply its own law to that issue.174 In Dick, there was insuffi-
cient Texas contact with the case to generate a legitimate Texas 
governmental interest in it; none could be identified to justify Tex-
as’s displacement of relevant Mexican or New York law. In Erie, no 
sovereign interest of the United States could be identified to justify 
a court’s displacement of relevant state law. 
(2) Reasonableness versus rationality. There is a further problem 
that the Constitution creates for choice-of-law rules. How can ab-
stract “rules” for choosing law avoid arbitrary or irrational govern-
ance? In Rowe, what could have been more reasonable than applica-
tion of the law of the place of purchase, treatment, injury, and the 
plaintiff’s own residence? But Michigan turned out to have zero in-
terest in the result, protecting another state’s tortfeasor, while 
denying Michigan’s own resident a chance to prove his case. There 
is a difference, it turns out, between reasonableness and rationality; 
and irrational law cannot be due process. 
                                                   
Clause; relying on the interest-analytic test announced in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 
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 171. Dick, 281 U.S. 397; cf. Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Gov-
ernmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9, 9–10 (1958). 
 172. Dick, 281 U.S. 397. 
 173. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that only the law of an identi-
fied sovereign can constitutionally apply in American courts, and that the sovereign whose 
law governs an issue is the same in all courts). 
 174. For exploration of this parallel between Erie and Dick, see Louise Weinberg, A Gen-
eral Theory of Governance: Due Process and Lawmaking Power, supra note 56. 
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The United States Supreme Court may never acknowledge the 
due process violation in a case like Rowe, but we can.175 We know 
that contacts, however many and seemingly important, are not al-
ways “significant.”176 A contact becomes significant only when it 
generates a legitimate interest in governance. As Chief Justice 
Rehnquist put this, “for a State’s substantive law to be selected in a 
constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a signifi-
cant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state in-
terests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamen-
tally unfair.”177
(3) The especially arbitrary choice. It is an interesting feature of the 
choice-of-law problem that American courts following choice-of-law 
rules will often choose law without any knowledge of what the law 
is at the respective concerned states. Choice rules commonly 
choose places, not laws. 
In applying a typical such rule, let us say, “the rule of the place 
of conduct governs the conduct of the defendant,” courts are con-
tent to choose law without knowing its content. The veil of igno-
rance, for such courts, is a warrant of special neutrality and fair-
ness, an assurance of the disinterestedness of the judges. But we 
may wonder why Justice, rightly blind to fear or favor, should be 
blind to justice itself. Typical choice rules are place-selecting—
”jurisdiction-selecting,” in David Cavers’ formulation178—and, be-
cause deliberately blind to the law at the place selected, are as neu-
tral as a flip of a coin. But who would want her legal rights deter-
mined by the flip of a coin? Does not such neutrality come at too 
high a price if it can result in pointless denials of justice? The place 
of injury or of conduct, or both, without any other contact with a 
case, has compensatory and deterrent interests only. It will be 
found to have no interest in applying a local defense to defeat or 
diminish the otherwise meritorious claims of out-of-staters. And we 
may find ourselves wondering whether the choice rule applied by 
the court was as blindly neutral as had been hoped. There is the 
likelihood that the judge purporting to be forced by a “rule” to 
hand judgment to the defendant knows very well that that will be 
the consequence of the choice. 
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 176. The vague rule of the “place of most significant contact” has a built-in error of re-
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 178. David Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 201 
(1933).
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I have focused here on due process, but it has long been under-
stood that arbitrary choices of law are discriminatory as well as 
wanting in due process.179 Such discrimination can be between the 
parties in a case, between similarly situated plaintiffs in different 
cases, and between similarly situated defendants in different cases. 
It can invoke the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, as 
well as the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the anti-discrimination component of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment. 
C. The ALI180 and the Nonresident Plaintiff 
(1) Discriminating against nonresidents. The preliminary draft of 
Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws takes the position, contrary to 
that urged here, that the forum should not impose liability on its 
resident defendant for a violation of forum standards when to do 
so would benefit a nonresident plaintiff.181 The position seems dis-
credited in the very utterance. But echoing Justice Alito’s cri de 
coeur in RJR-Nabisco, “We cannot rule the world,” the Reporters 
quote Judge Fuld in the old casebook case of Neumeier v. Kuehner,182
remarking that to allow the nonresident to recover for a violation 
of forum law would be to supply “manna to all the world.”183 In this 
view, justice for persons whose own states will not help them seems 
unreasonable. Yet injustice for such persons also seems unreasona-
ble. 
Take the particular problem of the nonresident plaintiff who 
has been injured elsewhere, one in the position of young Rowe, or 
the plaintiff countries in RJR-Nabisco. The Reporters of the Ameri-
can Law Institute’s current draft Restatement (Third) of Conflict of 
Laws do not want to see the ‘license to kill’ that the forum virtually 
issues when it withholds its justice from anyone injured elsewhere 
by a resident.184 It is the nonresident who most often has been in-
jured elsewhere. And consider that, if all states with remedial law 
refuse to apply it for nonresidents, there will exist a massive closing 
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of the doors of justice for the injured, who, beyond their own 
states’ borders, are nonresidents everywhere.185 Why would that be 
a good thing? Indeed, why would it ever be wrong for a court to 
furnish its justice evenhandedly to all who appear before it? If a 
court declines to discriminate against nonresidents, why is that a 
bad thing? 
(2) The problem of the “magnet forum.” If a court becomes a “mag-
net” for its remedial law, or for its competence, fairness, and acces-
sibility in cases within its jurisdiction, why is that a bad thing?186
There may be a fear that companies will flee the state in which lo-
cal courts enforce regulatory acts of the local legislature. In such 
cases, the political power of such companies was insufficient to 
block regulatory law, yet the threat of their leaving must depress 
the spirit of independence in any thoughtful judge. Threats, and 
distinctions in political power, are precisely the sort of external in-
fluences on a case that are not supposed to weigh, in a perfect 
world, on the scales of justice. In the face of a possible loss of major 
business to the state, one can only admire the courage of justice-
dispensing courts that do enforce local regulatory law. 
It may be pie in the sky to say this, but if all states reliably did en-
force local regulatory law, much injustice would be avoided. 
Meanwhile, a court that is valued so highly for fairness and compe-
tence as to become a magnet for multi-sovereign litigation (a court 
such as the illustrious Eastern District of New York, in which the 
European Community chose to bring its case against RJR) invites 
admiration rather than outrage. And the citizens of the magnet 
state can be confident that their renowned courts administer the 
law of the legislature they themselves have elected. 
(3) The ALI and the forum shopper. It is not entirely clear why 
plaintiffs’ freedom to choose the place of trial is so distressing to 
the ALI, and indeed to many judges and lawyers. Law students 
learn to think of forum shopping as an abuse, notwithstanding that 
the defendant in any event has to be within the jurisdiction of the 
forum. All this evident revulsion suggests a mental image of greedy 
lawyers who easily could have sued where plaintiffs reside, rushing 
to magnet forums, confident that the magnet forums can be 
counted on to provide “manna for all the world.” But in an actual 
case on the facts of Rowe v. Hoffmann-La Roche, it is hard to see how 
this “manna” scenario would play out. There are no lawyers, greedy 
or otherwise, urging patients to demand Accutane from their doc-
tors. Nor are there greedy patients out there risking death in order 
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to obtain damages in New Jersey. Nor should we regard with suspi-
cion lawyers defending misbehaving companies. What we do see in 
litigation of some importance are lawyers practicing our learned 
profession on either side of a versus sign, and generally doing so 
quite creditably. 
The Reporters are not embarrassed to say that they are “unaware 
of any support” for the position that a nonresident plaintiff should 
be allowed to recover under forum law.187 They decline to 
acknowledge the existence of regulatory interests at the forum, 
and in service of that stringency they are resolved to tolerate 
wholesale injustice to nonresident plaintiffs, not to mention disre-
gard of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Yet the Reporters 
acknowledge, at least, that their position is discriminatory. Unnerv-
ingly, they say that they are “comfortable” with this.188
The Reporters may have worked themselves into such positions 
in part because they sometimes use the place of injury as a “neu-
tral” tie-breaker, and any such abstract rule can yield arbitrary re-
sults. Yet the geographical location either of injuries or the injured 
is not a matter of concern to the conduct-regulating state. With 
preternaturally unperturbed inconsistency, the Reporters 
acknowledge this also.189
D. Regulatory Interests and the “Unprovided” Case 
(1) No law for the case. Robert Rowe’s case would seem to present 
a classic example of what experts in the conflict of laws would term 
“an unprovided case.”190 The unprovided case is a configuration of 
cases first identified by Brainerd Currie.191 An unprovided case is a 
case in which the law of the plaintiff’s state favors the defendant, 
and the law of the defendant’s state favors the plaintiff.192 In such a 
case, Currie posited that neither state would have any interest in 
having its law applied, since the plaintiff’s residence with defend-
ant-favoring law could have no interest in favoring other states’ de-
                                                   
 187. Draft Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws, supra note 57, at § xvi. 15. 
 188. Id. at § xv. 
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FALL 2019] Age of Unreason 55
fendants, and the defendant’s residence with plaintiff-favoring law 
could have no interest in favoring other states’ plaintiffs.193
In this Article, however, I have not viewed Rowe v. Hoffmann-La 
Roche as an unprovided case—although it fits the description. Ra-
ther, I have treated Rowe as a false conflict in which New Jersey was 
the only interested state. A false conflict case is one in which only 
one state has any interest in the application of its law. A false con-
flict is easily resolved by applying the law of “the only interested 
state.”194
In Rowe’s case, viewed as an “unprovided” one, New Jersey law 
favored the Michigan plaintiff, and Michigan law favored the New 
Jersey defendant. But by jettisoning the language about law “favor-
ing” one side or the other, and identifying law that is regulatory, 
we have been able to see the otherwise submerged interests of New 
Jersey in Rowe. What might have looked like an “unprovided” case 
thus begins to look very different. 
Somewhat to my chagrin, however, this way of thinking about 
Rowe puts me into unaccustomed agreement with an influential ar-
gument put forward by Larry Kramer. In a well-known early paper, 
Dean Kramer took the position that Currie’s unprovided case is a 
“myth.”195 It was part of his argument that some governmental in-
terest can usually be drummed up in one of the concerned states. 
For example, an unprovided case like Rowe might arise—one in 
which the interests of the two states were congruent, the difference 
being merely an exception. The unprovided case would then turn 
out to be a no-conflict case. (This was the initial reasoning of Judge 
LeFelt in the New Jersey Supreme Court in Rowe.) Kramer also 
pointed out that the place of injury with inapplicable defendant-
favoring law always has a residual interest, qua place of injury, in 
deterrence of a tort on its territory.196 Once some residual interest 
of that kind can be found, the unprovided case ceases to exist. 
So, by identifying the regulatory interest of New Jersey in Rowe, I 
seem to have illustrated Dean Kramer’s point for him197—that the 
unprovided case is a “myth.” 
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56 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 53:1 
I pause to note that Dean Kramer’s point does not matter. In a 
putatively unprovided case, as elsewhere, forum law is “the only 
clearly constitutional choice.”198 If law must be applied unjustifi-
ably, at least forum law will not discriminate between similarly situ-
ated parties in later cases. So whether Rowe was a false conflict in 
which New Jersey was the only interested state, or an unprovided 
case, the result should be the same. In either case, New Jersey law 
needed to be applied. 
(2) The regulatory state. At a deeper level, I have shown here that 
the unprovided case—indeed, a “myth”—is a myth not only be-
cause some interest in either contact state can always be drummed 
up. Rather, I am arguing that affirmative standards are not the be-
ginning and end of a legislature’s regulatory expedients. A liability 
rule of any kind at the forum where the defendant resides—a fea-
ture of the cases studied here, and an essential feature of Currie’s 
“unprovided” category—is likely to be as defendant-regulating as it 
is “plaintiff-favoring.” In other words, a liability rule can be per-
ceived as regulatory. This is also an insight of Michael Green.199 And 
so the case, “unprovided” at first blush, in which there is a liability 
rule at the forum, becomes a false conflict case rather than an un-
provided one. 
In Rowe, the imposition of liability simpliciter would have been 
more strongly regulatory than New Jersey’s law. Instead, since lia-
bility already existed under state common law, the New Jersey legis-
lature provided a defense of immunity and an exception to that 
defense, an exception for reckless disregard. This was regulation by 
exception, if you will, one of the kinds of unprovided cases which 
Dean Kramer (and I) turn into a false conflict. 
I would prefer to view such cases in a more general way. Gov-
ernmental interests can be protective and regulatory at the same 
time. New Jersey’s regulation in Rowe operated to protect plaintiff 
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patients using New Jersey pharmaceuticals, but only in egregious 
cases of deliberate or reckless failure to update warnings in light of 
experience. In ordinary cases of mere negligence the same provi-
sion operated to protect New Jersey defendant drug companies. 
The two concerns existed together in the statute. 
New Jersey’s law on damages in failure-to-warn cases is similarly 
Janus-faced. Damages may be awarded only where punitive damag-
es would be warranted, and this favors plaintiffs. But punitive dam-
ages themselves are proscribed, and this protects New Jersey drug 
makers from open-ended dollar liabilities. 
The New Jersey legislation affects plaintiffs in other ways as well. 
When the defendant’s conduct does not warrant punitive damages, 
New Jersey’s presumption about the sufficiency of warnings be-
comes as conclusive as Michigan’s. The plaintiff’s right to sue is ex-
tinguished. In other words, the statute is a threat as well as a prom-
ise, providing for contingencies facing either way.200
The New Jersey statute is properly characterized as “regulatory” 
when we recognize that it cannot be confined rationally to New 
Jersey plaintiffs.201 Insofar as warnings are concerned, it requires 
good behavior by New Jersey drug makers—good behavior to all 
the world. The state’s identified regulatory interests are reputa-
tional. The legislature wishes the entire market of its pharmaceuti-
cals industry, world-wide,202 to stand assured of the probity of New 
Jersey pharmaceuticals houses, and of the safety of their drugs, as 
reflected in the thoroughness and clarity of their warnings. This 
latter point suggests that the regulatory interest of the state in 
Rowe, even in enforcing a mere exception to a defense, is much too 
encompassing to warrant a description of Rowe’s case as “unpro-
vided.” Nor is that regulatory interest, embodied as it is in a statute, 
in any sense residual, or somehow drummed up. 
So, yes, Rowe was a false conflict to begin with, and New Jersey 
was the only interested state. In other words, the unprovided case 
is more of a myth than Dean Kramer may have supposed, and his 
“myth” thesis is descriptive of a broader swathe of cases than he or 
I have anticipated. 
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(3) Adjudicatory interests. Beyond this, I begin to suspect that 
Brainerd Currie’s category of “unprovided” cases apparently can 
amount to a “myth” whether or not some traditional interest in 
one of the contact states can be smoked out. I am thinking of the 
possibility of adjudicatory interests. Adjudicatory interests may be 
important enough to be taken into account. The forum would ap-
pear to have the interest that arises when both parties stand before 
it and submit to its justice. Law-providing and justice-providing in-
terests would be subsumed under this heading. Assuming uncon-
tested jurisdiction,203 there will be dispute-resolving, law-providing, 
justice-affording interests that arguably turn the forum into a suffi-
ciently interested one to justify it not only in taking a case but also 
in furnishing its own brand of justice for it. 
These interests are akin to, if not the perfect equivalent of, the 
similarly compound adjudicatory interests of the joint domicile.204
In the case of Hughes v. Fetter, for example, the Court, by Justice 
Black, held that a state court must take jurisdiction over a sister
state’s transitory cause of action.205 That holding is important and 
right. But Justice Black was assuming, in the fashion then custom-
ary, that the resultant case would be tried under the sister state’s 
law, because the tort “arose” in the sister state. It might explain 
Hughes v. Fetter in a more modern way to say that the forum state 
had no interest in not taking the case. But beyond this, I would ar-
gue that the forum state in Hughes v. Fetter had every interest in set-
tling the dispute between the parties, because of a fact not much 
emphasized by Justice Black. They were joint domiciliaries of the 
forum state. Indeed, a plaintiff may always sue at home, assuming 
jurisdiction over the defendant. The plaintiff pays taxes to fund 
her own state’s courts. It does not matter where her claim “arose.” 
These sorts of interests, although merely adjudicatory, are 
stronger than might be thought. Imagine a case Currie would call 
an unprovided one. For the sake of argument, let us disregard the 
fact that the liability rule at the forum reflects a regulatory interest, 
and assume, as a traditional interest analyst would, that the forum 
                                                   
 203. For a learned and comprehensive discussion of the effect of personal jurisdiction 
limits on trans-sovereign litigation, see Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Rethinking the State Sovereignty Inter-
est in Personal Jurisdiction, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769 (2016); see also for valuable insights, 
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 204. See Linda J. Silberman & Nathan D. Yaffe, The Transnational Case in Conflict of Laws: 
Two Suggestions for the New Restatement Third of Conflict of Laws, 27 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
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 205. 341 U.S. 609 (1951) (placing state courts under obligation to try a transitory action 
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is an “uninterested” one. We can see, nevertheless, that the “unin-
terested” forum’s contacts with a case, qua forum, are hardly in-
considerable. 
 The defendant has submitted itself to the benefits and 
burdens of forum law. This is the classic understanding 
of a constitutional exercise of jurisdiction. 
 The plaintiff has shopped for the forum, precisely, for 
its law. 
 The judges at the forum are pledged under the oath of 
office to uphold the forum’s law. 
 The insurer presumably has the actuarial expertise to 
have predicted and evaluated the risk of trial at a place 
with plaintiff-favoring law, and to have accounted for 
that risk in the premium charged the defendant. 
True, these connections with the forum are not “significant” in 
the sense in which any choice-of-law theory would find them. True, 
the weighing or balancing of interests, especially insignificant ones, 
is an unprofitable enterprise. But together, these identified con-
nections between the forum and the the case do appear to take on 
some weight as against the position of the other state. Consider 
that the other state in our putatively unprovided case can boast as a 
“contact” only the residence of a plaintiff it will not allow to recov-
er,206 and, perhaps an injury on its territory which it declines to re-
mediate.207 And this other state has no interest in frustrating its res-
ident’s chance to recover in any other state’s courts, as long as it 
has no relation to the defendant. After all, the plaintiff’s uninter-
ested state of residence is somewhat better off, as I have pointed 
out here, when its resident returns with funds.208
I have been trying to show that the forum is unlikely, whatever 
the case, to be a wholly uninterested one. Moreover, I have argued 
that the only law consistent with democratic theory is the law of the 
forum—barring some statute authorizing courts in conflicts cases 
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to decline to follow their own precedents, or to fashion new rules 
of their own, or to enforce a code of choice rules enacted by their 
own legislature.209 In a sense, even sister state law in courts is forum 
law, since in applying it judges make a policy choice. These things 
being so, the conclusion that the forum should, and probably 
must, apply its own law, should not be very surprising, although I 
must acknowledge that few can be found today who would agree 
with me about this. 
CONCLUSION: THE PHENOMENON OF UNREASON
We see the force of regulatory interests quite vividly in our 
transnational case, RJR-Nabisco, with the Patriot Act’s response to 
9/11 in Civil RICO. More subtle is the regulatory interest of the 
state in the case of Rowe v. Hoffmann-La Roche. But, overt or subtle, 
when regulatory interests at the forum are apparent, it will not do 
to say, “This is an uninterested state” simply because the state can 
be said not to “favor” its own. A state or country, the laws of which 
would bear down on its culpable resident defendants, cannot be 
deemed to be “uninterested.” 
The struggle for reason we have noted in the configuration of 
cases explored here simply reflects—in two ways—the want of in-
terest in the nonforum state in impeding vindication of the fo-
rum’s legitimate governmental interests. First, in every false con-
flict in which the forum is the only interested state, the nonforum 
state will have no interest in applying its law, ex hypothesi. So, of 
course, there will be a struggle to find some reason for applying 
that other state’s law. This explains the futile struggle for reason in 
cases like RJR-Nabisco and Rowe. Second, in every no-conflict case in 
which forum policy is shared, the nonforum state will also have no 
interest in applying its law. In RJR-Nabisco, the American forum 
shared with the twenty-six plaintiff countries the policies ground-
ing the act of Congress. The European Community had no interest 
at all in impeding vindication of the United States’ legitimate gov-
ernmental interests. A sovereign sharing the regulatory interest of 
the forum will have as little reason as an uninterested sovereign in 
furnishing a defense. So of course there were futile struggles for 
reason in both RJR-Nabisco and Rowe.
We might suppose that a court has broad discretion to withhold 
its own law for good and sufficient reasons. The problem—the sub-
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ject of this paper—is that good and sufficient reasons are not easily 
found for doing so when a case falls within the home sovereign’s 
sphere of legitimate governmental interests. 
All law is limited by the rational scope of its purposes. When tort 
law is plaintiff-favoring, it is also regulatory. As a practical matter, 
law is deterrent when it is compensatory. And law’s regulatory pur-
poses, as a general rule, are not territorially limited. Application of 
case law limits on regulatory law, in my view, should require ra-
tional justification on the facts of the particular case. When reason 
will not support those limits, the forum’s regulatory law must be 
enforced. 
We have seen here the difficulty courts at the regulatory state 
encounter in a certain configuration of cases when they attempt to 
depart from their own law. Arguments offered to support a depar-
ture from forum law in this class of cases can seem to turn sour, 
like good milk curdling as we watch. Courts withholding regulatory 
law, as we have seen in our analyses of Rowe and RJR-Nabisco, can 
put into the hands of a predatory company a license to injure 
without fear of damages in courts at home. This is a result as dan-
gerous as it is arbitrary and unjust. 
What Holmes called “the life of the law” has to be logic, in some 
measure, as well as experience, although Holmes disputed this.210
What I mean is that the life of the law, in large part, is reason. As 
long as judges and lawyers fail to identify and accord due weight to 
the purposes of law—to the legitimate governmental interests the 
law would function to vindicate—there is an identified configura-
tion of cases in which defenses are likely to turn irrational, and an 
apparent want of neutrality is likely to embarrass judgment. 
This too-common collapse of reason—and the collapse of justice 
with it—is a rather startling—and indeed unsettling—discovery. 
Unreason in the decision of cases can do no honor to our country, 
our courts, or to the grand tradition of the rule of law. 
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